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Disregarding the international dimension of tax policy is risky.
Foreign tax regimes and international tax-planning practices of
companies can frustrate domestic goals of taxation.
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In this paper, Leechor and Mintz propose a  increasingly integrated world economy, firms
framework for analyzing intemational-income  have considerable freedom in redeploying capital
taxation. The standard approach, involving the  across countries. Second, there is substantial
user cost of capital, is extended to incorporate  scope for firms to reallocate income and ex-
the role of tax policy implemented by the home  penses between the host and the home countries
country. The usual presumption that only taxes  through intemal pricing policies.  Third, firms
of the host country matter is shown to be invalid,  can devise an advantageous financial structure
except under very restricted circumstances. The  by choosing appropriate debt-equity ratios and
authors also apply this new framework to an  by borrowing in a country where treaty provi-
empirical analysis of Thailand's policy issues.  sions are favorable. These strategic decisions
can circumvent the host's effort to raise taxes.
Tax provisions of home countries vary
significantly.  Of particular relevance are (1)  Thailand has come to grips with many of the
whether remitted eamings are taxed at home, (2)  issues.  It has sought and achieved doublc-
if so, whether they receive any unilateral tax  taxation agreements with most of its trading
relief, that is, deduction or foreign tax credit, (3)  partners.  It has attracted substantial foreign
whether the home country accepts tax sparing,  investments and collected the attendant revenue.
which allows firms to retain the tax benefits  Its tax policy remains i ulnerable in many areas,
provided at source, and (4) the scope and extent  however.  There are, for example, inadequate
of deductible expenses, which generally differ  safeguards against excessive leverage, transfer
from those of the host. These provisions may  pricing, and treaty shopping.  Its strategy con-
counteract the host's tax measures, particularly  ceming tax incentives could also be strengthened
the use of tax concessions.  to remove the barriers for extending the treaty
network and enhancing regional coordination.
Also of interest to the host are firns'  interna-
tional tax planning opportunities.  First, in an
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EXECUTIVE  SUMHARY
Making  tax  policy  in an increasingly  integrated  world  economy  is a
difficult task.  In recent years, a large number of theoretical and
empirical  studies  has  been  undertaken  to clarify  the  issues  involved nd to
develop  a framework  for  policy  analysis. This report  has the same basic
objectives. But  unlike  much of the  existing  literature,  the focus  of this
report  is on the  questions  faced  by developing  countries  in their  capacity
as hosts of foreign  investments. The difference  is essentially  one of
emphasis  and applications,  however. The  basic  analytical  methods,  as  well
as broader economic issues, are equally applicable to industrialized,
capital  exporting  countries.
The  main part  of this  report  is devoted  to analyzing  the impact  of
taxation on the financing and  investment decisions of multinational
companies. A model is developed  to incorporate  tax  provisions  of both the
host and  the  home countries. From  this  effort,  new analytical  results  are
derived.  The second  part of this report  applies  this new framework  to
examine  issues  of  national  welfare. As an illustration,  a case  study  based
on the tax systems of Thailand  and its capital  exporting  countries  is
carried  out.  The  third  part  considers  the  implications  of current  taxation
on the  global  allocation  of resources.
1.  Impact  of Taxation
As  with traditional  studies  of investments,  the  effects  of taxation
are measured through the "user  cost of capital",  or the gross rate of
return  (including  depreciation)  required  of new investments. An increase- li  -
in tnie  user cost of capital indicates a deterioration  of investment
incentives,  as there  are fewer  projects  with adequate  rates  of return  to
meet a more stringent  requirement. Taxation  influences  the user coat of
capital  in three  ways:  (i) it raises  the required  returns  to allow for
payments  of taxes  due; (ii)  through  various  deductions,  it  lowers  the  net-
of-tax costs of acquiring  the investment  goods; (iii)  taxes on capital
gains  and  personal  income  tend  to raise  the  discount  rates  used  by firms  in
evaluating  projects. This study  examines  the  interactions  of tax rules  of
the  host and  home  countries  in  determining  the  user  cost  of capital  facing
multinational  firms.
Our analysis shows substantial  variations in the user cost of
capital  found  in a given  host  country. The  variability  is attributable  to
the  following  factors:
(a) Country  of Ownership  of Capital.  Taxation  of the home country
affects  capital  income  in different  ways.  Some countries  exempt  all
forms  of foreign-source  income,  thus leaving  the  user cost  of capital
to be determined  by host country  taxation.  Some tax all forms of
foreign-source  income  when it is repatriated  to the  home  country,  with
relief  granted  for foreign  taxes.  This tax regime  (known  as deferral
taxation)  may  increase  taxes paid by multinational  firms or reduce
them, depending on relative tax rates and the rules governing  tax
relief. Thus,  foreign  affiliates  located  in a given  host  country  face
different user  costs  of  capital, depending  on  the  tax  regime
implemented  at  home.
This finding is at variance with well-known results of past
studies. Many analysts  have  suggested  that,  when foreign  investment  is
financed  by retained  earnings,  taxation  of the home country  does not^  iii  -
matter. The basic  reasoning  is that  home  country  taxation  has already
been capitalized  in the market  valuation  of equity.  Thus, the tax
saving  made possible  by deferral  compensates  for the subsequent  taxes
paid.  Our analysis  shows  that such a result  holds only under  very
special circumstances:  multinational firms must  avoid remitting
dividends to the home country or the capital al3awances (for tax
purposes)  have to be identical  in the host and home countries. In a
general  case, tax rates and provisions  of the kome country  do enter
into the user cost of capital and thereby inf'uence investment
decisions.
(b) Type  of Organization.  Branches  and  locally  incorporated
subsidiaries are subject to different tax treatment in the home
countries. Branch  income  is taxed  at home  when it is earned  (accrual
taxation),  whereas  the income  of a subsidiary  is generally  subject  to
deferral  taxation. Under  accrual  taxation,  multinational  firms  cannot
defer home-country taxes,  but can write off foreign  losses  against
taxable  income  at  home.  Our  analysis  shows  that  under  accrual  taxation
only  the  tax  rules  of  the  home  country  affect  the  user  cost  of  capital.
(c) Rate of Remittance. Under  deferral  taxation,  only a fraction  of
company  income  earned  abroad  is taxable. Similarly,  only  a fraction  of
company  taxes  paid  abroad  are  creditable.  This  fraction  is  determined
by the ratio of dividends  remitted  and taxable  profits  as defined  at
home.  Our analysis  suggests  that the role of home-country  taxes in
determining  the user cost of capital increases  witi'  this rate of
remittance.- iv  -
(d)  Financ  .l  PolicX.  Part of the user  cost of capital is  the
required  return  for  the  marginal  source  of  finance.  In  an
international  context,  finance  may be raised  from retain  earnings,
home-country  debt and host-country  debt.  To the extent  that real
interest  rates  are  unequal  across  countries,  user  costs  of  capital  also
vary, depending on the country in which  capital is raised.  In
addition,  the  debt-equity  ratio  ia  also  relevant,  since  the  two  sources
of finance  are  not  taxed  equally.
(e)  Net Foreign  Tax Credit  Position.  Taxes  ultimately  paid at home
also  depend  on firms'  net foreign  tax  credit  position. Excess  foreign
tax credits  enable a firm to remit additional  foreign-source  income
with little  or no further  taxation  at home.  A deficient  foreign-t.x-
credit  position  has the opposite  effects. The net foreign-tax-credit
position  of a firm,  in turn,  depends  on the  relative  tax  rates  of the
home and host countries  as well as the extent to which the credit
applies.  Some capital exporters allow global crediting,  in which
credits  arising from one host country  may be applied  to the income
originating  from  another  country. In other  cases,  foreign  tax  credits
may be country-specific.
2.  National  Welfare
(a) Developing  Countries  in  General
Tax policy  may fail to serve national  interest  if it is based
entirely  on traditional,  one-country  fremework. This  section  draws  on the
multi-country  analysis  presented  above  to indicate  the  scope  and
constraints  faced  by a developing  country.
An  important  feature of policy-making  in an international
environment  is the  strategic  behavior  of  the  parties  concerned.-v-
Multinational  companies, for instance,  have considerable  tax p:anning
opportunities.  At  their disposal ares (i) the choice of financial
policies; (ii) internal  pricing strategies  for allocating  income  across
countries;  (iii) choice  of source  countries  to set up operations;  (iv)
choice of countries for repatriation  of earnings  to take advantage  of
existing  tax  treaties. There  are  also  other  national  governments  involved.
Their  tax  rules  may counteract  or cancel  the  effects  of the  host country's
policies.  If not, new retaliatory  measures  may be undertaken.  Many
developing  countries,  for instance,  routinely  niatch  the tax concessions
provided  by their  neighbors.
one  measure  often  recommended  in the  context  of one  country  is to
convert the traditionally  defined  income  base of company taxation  to a
cash-flow  base.  The rationale  is to remove  an intertemporal  distortion,
which discriminates  against  saving. A cash-flow  tax  is a tax on rents  or
inframarginal  returns,  with no impact  on incentives. In an international
context,  however,  such a reform  may a.  produce  the desired  result.  If
exemption is followed in the home countries,  no further complications
arise.  But the earnings  may also be subject to deferral or accrual
taxation  abroad.  In this  case,  the tax  base  would  be redefined  according
to the tax rules  at home.  The home country's  tax regime  would therefore
supercede  the cash-flow  tax  and  the  neutrality  sought  by the  host  would  be
frustrated.  The host country undertaking  the reform would thus lose
revenue,  without  generating  the  desired  incentives.
As another  example,  consider  a capital  importer's  desire  to raise
the  level  of  taxation  on  foreign affiliates  (branches as well  as
subsidiaries)  operating  within  its  jurisdiction.  If the  foreign  owners  are
under the exemption  tax regime  at home,  the additional  taxes  would lower- vJt -
their  net income. The companies  involved  would therefore  attempt  to lower
the tax  burden  by incurring  more debt  and  by shifting  profits  to the  home
country  (or  another  low-tax  jurisdiction)  through  transfer  pricing.  They
may also find it advantageous  to undertake new investments  elsewhere.
Companies  subject  to deferral  and  accrval  taxation  are  less  averse  to a tax
increase  at source,  since some of the taxes  paid are creditable  against
taxes at home.  There are many restrictions  applied to home-country
crediting,  however.  First,  credits  for foreign  taxes  may be limited  in
many cases to the amount  of home-country  tax liabilities. If taxes are
higher  in the  host country,  some  of the  taxes  paid at source  will n.t De
creditable at home.  Second, non-resident  withholding  taxes above anid
beyond  a stipulated  percentage  may not be creditable  at home.  Once the
companies reach an excess foreign tax credit  position  for the desired
repatriations,  they  would have an incentive  to avoid  further  taxation  at
source, as with companies  under the exemption  regime.  There are thus
serious  constraints  to aggressive  revenue  measures.
Nor can a  country attract unlimited foreign investments by
offering  more generous  tax concessions  than its competitors.  The most
obvious obstacle to this practice is the competitors'  reaction,  which
includes  the  option  of  providing  matching  concessions.  Tax  incentives  also
fail  to attract  more  investments  if they  accrue  to the  types  of income  that
are taxed in the home country.  Tax exemptions  or reductions  at source
reduce  foreign  tax credits  available  and therefo-  e increase  taxes  payable
at home.  In this case, the concessions  granted  represent  a transfer  of
revenue  from  the  host  to the  home  country.
To avoid  wasteful  transfers  of revenue,  many developing  countries
seek to obtain  a tax-sparing  agreement  in their bilateral  treaties  with- vii  -
capital  exporters. Under  a tax-sparing  provision,  mulcinational  companie*
receive  foreign  tax credits  at home for the taxes  exempted  by the host.
(Source taxes are deemed to have been paid.)  From the host country's
perspective,  tax sparing ensures that the benefits  of tax concessions
accrue  to the companies,  or their  owners,  rather  than the home country's
government. Clearly,  tax sparing  is relevant  only when the home country
taxes foreign-source  income  and uses tax credits (as distinct  from tax
deductions)  to  relieve  double  taxation.
Thus a  host country  does not necessarily  give away its share  of
revenue  when it provides  tax concessions, The extenuating  circumstances
are tax-sparing  provisions  and tax exemption  of foreign-source  income  by
home  countries. More fundamental  questions  facing  the  host  country  remain
to be answered,  however:  Do tax incentives  actually  generate  additional
investments? If so,  are the  added  investments  worth the loss in revenue?
These  questions  have  to  be considered  on a  case  by case  basis.
(b) The  Case  of  Thailand
Thailand  has a  conventional  system  of company  taxation,  with  about
average  tax rates  compared  to its trading  partners  and relatively  liberal
deduction  rules. Non-iisidents'  withholding  tax  rates  are  relatively  high,
by the  standards  of  OECD  countries,  although  treaty  provisions  often  reduce
the rates  somewhat. In addition,  Thailand  offers  a variety  of income  tax
concessions  with liberal  eligibility  criteria. It has an extensive  treaty
network,  covering  major  trading  partners,  with the  exception  of the  United
States--its second largest capital exporter.  There are significant
variations  across  treaties,  however,  with respect  to tax rates  and other
major  provisions.- viii  -
At first  sight,  there  appears  to  be little  room  fox improving  the
taxation  international  income.  Foreign  affiliates  (branches  as well as
subsidiaries) contribute substantial tax revenue; ir.  fact, they pay
proportionately  more taxes than do purely  domestic  firms,  according  to a
random  sample  of financial  statements. Moreover,  t6'e  volume  of foreign
investments  in recent  years  has been very high, exceeding  the levels  in
neighboring  countries  (on  a per  capita  basis.) It is  therefore  tempting  to
regard  the  tax  regime  as  being  highly  satisfactory,  with appropriate  levels
of taxation  in  place  and  adequate  incentives  provided.
But in fact there is considerable  scope for further  work.  The
most  promising  area  is  to curtail  the  opportunities  for  tax  planning  on the
part of multinational  firms.  Thailand  could, for example,  narrow the
differentials  in  withholding  tax  rates  across  treaty  partners  to reduce  the
incEntives  for treaty-shopping and rerouting of foreign investors'
earnings.  It could also apply a thin-capitalization  rule to disallow
interest  deductions  on the  portion  of  debt  in excess  of a given  debt-equity
ratio.  Such  a rule  would also limit  the transfers  of revenue  to the  home
countries  in  which  similar  deduction  rules  are  already  implemented. There
is also a need to safeguard  against  brazen  cases of transfer  pricing;  a
form of minimum company  tax is more appropriate  than the current  use of
pervasive  import  tariffs  for  4his  purpose.
Thailand would  also benefit from a  reassessment of its tax
concessions. At present  there  are issues  of design  as well as strategy.
First,  the  revenue  currently  given  up by Thailand  becomes  a  transfer  if the
recipient  companies  are residents  of non-treaty  countries,  including  the
United  States. This issue  would  not arise  if the  incentives  were to  be in
the forms  of investment  tax  credits  or initial  allowances,  rather  than  tax- ix -
holidays and reductions.  (These  alternative  instruments  are also less
susceptible  to  abuses  such  as inter-company  profit  shifting  within  the  host
countries.)  Second, because tax reductions  and holidays  are granted,
Thailand  has consistently  required  in its  treaties  a tax-spa  ing  provision
on the income  that is subject  to tax  abroad. This requirement  limits  the
country's flexibility  in treaty negotiations;  it has also held up the
conclusion  of several  double  taxation  agreements. Third,  at the current
rate of capital inflows which is straining the capacity of existing
inftastructure,  tax  inducements  may  no longer  be necessary.
3.  InRlications  for  Global  Resource  Allocation
When each.  country  pu sues its own rational  welfare,  there is no
guarantee that the resulting global environment  will be conducive to
efficient  use of resources.  Efficiency  requires  capital  to be properly
allocated  over time and across  countries,  regardless  of ownership.  The
analysis  of  incentives  and  national  policies  above  suggests  that
considerable  misallocations  are likely  to take place undar the existing
internation.l  tax  systems.
Capital  is efficiently  allocated  over time (dynamic  efficiency)
when the rate  of return  (gross  of tax)  on capital  is equal  to the rate  of
return received by individual  savers.  Company taxation  as implemented
today creates a wedge between the returns to investment  and saving,
resulting  in a disincentive  to save.  Horeover,  the current  international
tax  system  creates  opportunities  to  export  taxes  through  the  use  of foreign
tax credits. These  opportunities  encourage  capital  importing  countries  to
tax capital  income  more than they would otherwise.  (The incentives  to
export  taxes  do not  exist,  however,  when capital  exporting  countries  exempt
foreign-source  income  or  allow  the  use  of tax  sparing.)if  icient  allocation  of capital  across  countries  occurs  when the
rates  of  return  on capital  are  equalized in all source countries
irrespective  of ownership.  This condition  requires  both capital  export
neutrality as well as capital import neutrality.  The analysis above
suggests,  however,  that  neither  form  of neutrality  is attained  today. The
level  of taxation  in a given  host country  varies  by the tax regimes  of
capital exporters,  not equalized as required under import neutrality.
Similarly,  capital  originating  from  a given  country  of residence  is taxed
at different  rates  depending  on the  form  of organization  and the rules  of
the source countries, contrary to the requirement for capital export
neutrality.
It is therefore  very difficult  to create  a neutral  tax system  in
an international  context.  First,  since  taxation  of capital  income  is so
pervasive,  fundamental  reforms  designed  to improve  dynamic  efficiency  may
not be feasible  in the foreseeable  future.  Second,  equity is also an
important  policy objective,  making it necessary  to retain income-based
taxation.  Of greater  promise,  perhaps,  is the possibility  of improving
capital  allocation  across  countries.  What  is needed  is  greater
harmonization  of taxes on capital  income  as is done across  states and
provinces  in  federal  countries.
Tax  harmunization  occurs  today  to a limited  extent. The  principal
vehicle  for  harmonization  is  bilateral  tax  treaties,  which  are intended  to
prevent  double  taxation  and allocate  taxing  power  between  two countries.
There  are considerable variations, however, in tax rates and other
provisions  across  tax  treaties. Moreover,  treaty  negotiations  do  not  cover
the company-income-tax  provisions,  which are regarded  as purely  domestic
matters.  The scope of harmonization  is thus confined  to non-resident- xi  -
withholding taxes as well as the allocations  of expenses  to different
jurisdictions.
A new approach  is  needed  to achieve  world-wide  tax  harmonization.
The focus  of coordination  should  be capital  income  taxation  in totality,
rather than a component  thereof.  Furthermore,  a multilateral  framework
should  replace  the  current  system  of bilateral  treaties. Such  an approach
is clearly more difficult to implement  at a global level than in one
country. But  it  is also  feasible,  as demonstrated  by the  various  rounds  of
multilateral  trade  negotiations  under  the  aegis  of the  United  Nations.I.  INTRODUCTION
The international  dimensions  of tax  policy  are  of considerable
importance  to  both industrial  and  developing  countries. Industrial
countries,  however,  have  grappled  with the  issues  for  some  time  and  are
considerably  more  familiar  with  them  than  are  less  developed  countries. Only
recently  have tax  authorities  in  some  developing  countries  begun  to
incorporate  external  factors,  including  foreign  tax  rules  and  multinational
firms'  tax  planning,  in  policy-making.  But  even  those  who  have  done  so find
it  difficult  to devise  appropriate  policies,  due  to the  lack  of a guiding
framework,  and the  scarcity  of information,  applicable  to  capital  importers.
This report  is  an initial  effort  to  address  these  issues. We thus
review  the  analytical  and  policy  questions  pertinent  to the  taxation  of
international  income  by developing  countries. Two  broad  themes  are  of
principal  importance  to  this  review:
A.  Incentives
This  topic  deals  with the  impacts  of taxation  on investment  and
financing  decisions  of a  multinational  company. International  flows  of
income  are  subject  to  host country  taxation  on the  income  generated  by a
subsidiary  operating  in its  jurisdiction.  When the  parent  company  receives
foreign-source  income  from  the  subsidiary,  the  home  country  may  assess
another  layer  of tax,  allowing  host  country  taxes  to  be credited  or deducted
from  foreign-source  income  as  defined  by the  home  country. There  are
different  tax  regimes,  depending  on the  way in  which  a  home  country  taxes
foreign-source  income. The  three  regimes  considered  in this  study  are:
a.  Accrual  taxation  of foreign-source  income  by the  home  country,
which  applies  to  branch  income  or subsidiaries  operating  in tax
haven  countries.-2-
b.  Taxation  of remitted  income  from  foreign  sources,  which
generally  aLpplies  to  subsidiaries  and  will  be referred  to  as
"deferral"  taxation.
c.  Exemption  of foreign-source  income  either  on  a partial  or full
basis. Usually  equity  income  is exempt,  with other  sources  of
income  taxable.
Of the  three  regimes,  the  most important  is  deferral  taxation,
which  is currently  used  by the  largest  capital-exporting  countries,
including,  the  United  States,  Japan,  and  the  United  Kingdom. Previous
economic  analysis  of deferral  taxation  has suggested  that  subsidiary
investment  decisions  are  independent  of the  home  country's  tax  system  when
retentions  are  used (Hartman  [1985]). Our  analysis,  however,  shows  that
this  result  is incorrect. In fact,  the  user cost  of capital  for  a
subsidiary  using  retentions  to finance  investment  depends  on  both  host  and
home  country  taxes. 1 Only if  the  home  country  exempts  foreign-source  income
is the  user  cost  of capital  exclusively  determined  by the  host country's  tax
system.
The taxation  of investment  income  also  depends  on  a series  of
bilateral  treaties. These  treaties  determine  the  rates  of withholding  tax
and  other  provisions,  such  as "non-discrimination"  between  domestic  and
foreign-owned  capital  and  the  definition  of "permanent  establishment",  which
determines  the  right  of the  host  country  to tax  a  business. As a result  of
this  decentralized  approach  to  the  taxation  of international  income  (in
contrast  to the  multilateral  approach  used  for  trade  negotiations),  the
effects  of taxation  on financing  and  investment  decisions  can  be quite
1/  The  cost  of capital  depends  on the  home  country's  tax  on remitted  income
as long  as tax  provisions,  such  as the  capital  cost  allowance,  used  by
the  home  country's  authority  differs  from  that  used  by the  host country.
Annex  I derives  this  result  in  detail.- 3 -
complicated  to  determine. In  particular,  the  analysis  depends  on  how
companies  try  to  minimize  taxes,  given  the  costs  incurred  by relying  on
particular  forms  of finance,  such  as  bankruptcy  costs  and  political  risks
that  are  important  to the  investor. Our  approach  in  analyzing  the  effects
of international  tax  systems  draws  on  various  models,  each  with a different
set  of assumptions  concerning  financial  choices  made  by firms.
B.  Tax  Policy  Issues
The second  topic  deals  with the  level  and structure  of  company  and
withholding  taxes. What are  the  appropriate  policies  concerning  these
instruments  when the  capital  importer  attempts  to  maximize  the  benefits
associated  with international  flows  of capital? In this  connection,  we are
also  concerned  with the  extent  to  which  company  tax  policies  are  constrained
by tax  regimes  of capital  exporters  and  other  capital-importing  countries.
Two  aspects  of the  above  are  particularly  important. First,  the
appropriate  level  of taxation  set  by the  host country  depends  on the  price
elasticity  of foreign  capital. One  determinant  of the  elasticity  is the
method  of taxation  used  by the  home  country  as discussed  above. For
example,  if the  host country's  taxes  are  fully  credited  against  the  home
country's  tax,  then  a reduction  in taxes  on foreign  capital  by the  capital-
importer  leads  to a transfer  of revenue  from  the  host to  home government's
treasury  without  affecting  investment.  From  the  point  of  view of the  host
country,  lowering  taxes  on foreign  capital  under  this  tax  regime  reduces  the
country's  welfare.
The second  aspect  concerns  capital  mobility. With taxation,
capital  may flee  from  one  country  to  another  with  a  more favorable  tax
regime. As a result,  countries  that  are  concerned  about  the-4-
'competitiveness"  of their  tax  regimes  choose  tax  policies  that  mitigate  tax
competition.  We will  examine  the  extent  to  which  tax  competition  affects
tax  policy  and  the  types  of strategies  that  could  be undertaken  to reduce
the  impacts  of tax  competition.  These  strategies  include  the  types  of the
treaties  that  may  be chosen  to  eliminate  tax  competition.
Company  tax  policy  cannot  be  viewed  in isolation  from  other  public
policies. Many  developing  countries  promote  industrial  growth  not  only
through  tax  incentives  but also  a  variety  of other  instruments  such  as
quotas,  tariffs  and  regulations  that  encourage  import  substitution,  export
promotion  and local  participation  in  management  and  production. Each  of
these  policies  has different  implications  for  domestic  welfare. In this
paper,  however,  we primarily  concentrate  on company  tax  issues,  although  we
recognized  that  in  practice  a  wider  set  of options  must  be considered.
The incentive  and  policy  issues  are  examined  more  closely  in  a case
study  involving  Thailand. A fast  growing  economy,  Thailand  has  been growing
at about  10%  a  year in real  terms  in the  late  1980s. It  has also
experienced  a substantial,  if  not  unparalleled,  increase  in  foreign  savings
of  more than  250%  in 1988. Taxation  of international  income  raises  a  number
of interesting  issues  at  Thailand's  current  stage  of development, including
the  following:
a.  To encourage  foreign  investment,  Thailand  has  used  exemptions  and
reductions  for  company  income  tax  and  dividend  withholding  tax. These
incentives  are  now  being  questioned  as to  whether  they  are  too  generous
since  other  factors,  such  a  political  stability  and  low  unit  costs  of
production,  may  be sufficient  to  attract  foreign  investment.
b.  Thailand  is  concerned  about  its  ability  to attract  foreign
investment  relative  to other  adjacent  countries: Malaysia,  Indonesia,Singapore  and  the  Philippines.  Tax  incentives  provided  by other
countries  include  tax  holidays,  accelerated  depreciation,  and/or
investment  allowances.  An important  question  faced  by Thailand  is
whether  to  match  the  incentives  provided  by other  competing  capital-
importing  countries.
c.  Company  taxation  of multinational  investment  is  made  difficult  by
limited  information  regarding  the  prices  of internationally  traded
goods  and  services  required  in the  determination  of taxable  income. To
ensure  adequate  taxation,  the  Thai  government  must  rely  on
unsatisfactory  ad  hoc  methods  including  high import  duties  to
discourage  overinvoicing  of imported  inputs. These  measures,  however,
create  by-product  distortions  of their  own  and  are in  any  case  of
limited  effectiveness.  Thus,  there  is  a desire  for  new  approaches  to
the  taxation  of international  investment  income.
d.  Thailand  has  used import  duties  and  business  tax  exemptions  for
capital  goods  of  promoted  firms. The  proposed  introduction  of a  value-
added  tax (VAT)  and  restructuring  of import  duties  will erode  the  tax
advantages  now  enjoyed  by promoted  firms,  many of  which  are  foreign-
owned  or controlled.  Given  the  changes  contemplated  for  these  taxes,
one  of the  natural  questions  to  ask  is  how should  the  company  tax  be
modified  with respect  to foreign  investment.
The outline  of this  paper  is  as follows. In Section  II,  we
describe  the  current  tax  regimes  of  Thailand  and  capital-exporting
countries. In Section  III,  we examine  how taxes  influence  financing  and
investments  decisions  of companies  operating  in  Trhailand,  depending  on the
origin  of capital  investment.  The  theoretical  model  for  this  analysis  is
presented  separately  in  Annex  I.  Section  IV  considers  policy  issues  from
the  perspective  of Thailand. In  particular,  we examine  the  treatment  offoreign  companies  and  the  withholding  taxes  imposed  on income  remitted
abroad. Section  V deals  with the  implications  of national  taxation  on
world-wide  resource  allocation. It  also  reviews  the  successes  and
limitations  of the  current  bilateral  approach  to  tax  coordination.-7-
II.  TAX REGIMES OF  TH'ILAND AND CAPITAL  EXPORTING COUNTRIES
This  section  is  divided  into  three  parts:  (A)  Thai  taxation  of
foreign  affiliates,  (B)  taxation  by countries  of  residence,  and (C)  tax
treaties. This  discussions  in this  section  provide  basic  tax  rates  and
provisions  required  for  subsequent  analysis..
A.  Thai  Taxation  of Foreign  Affiliates
Two  types  of taxes  are  paid  by foreign  affiliates  operating  in
Thailand:  (1)  internal  taxes,  both  direct  and  indirect,  which  also  cover
Thai  entities  in the  same  manners;  (2)  non-resident  withholding  taxes,
levied  upon repatriation  of earnings  out  of  Thailand.
1.  Internal  Taxes
a.  Comoanv  Tax
The  standard  rate  of company  taxation  is  currently  35%,  applicable
to  branches  of foreign  companies,  locally  incorporated  subsidiaries  as  well
as  wholly  Thai  entities. 2 Lower  tax  rates  are  available  under  two  major
incentive  programs  (i)  investment  promotion,  administered  by the  Board  of
Investment  (BOI)  and (ii)  stock  market  development,  supervised  by the
Security  Exchange  of Thailand  (SET). The  BOI  grants  temporary  tax  holidays
or substantial  tax  reductions  for  projects  that  fulfill  its  specified
eligibility  conditions. The  SET  provides  guidelines  on ownership  patterns
and  standards  of financial  reporting. Companies  that  are  listed  in  the
2/  Companies  engaged  in international  transport  as  well as  petroleum
exploration  and  production  are  subject  to  different  tax  treatments.  In
transport,  an income  tax  of 3%  of gross  receipts  originating  in  Thailand
is  collected. If the  carrier's  country  of residence  is  a treaty
partner,  the  rate  is reduced  to 1.5%.  Petroleum  companies  are  covered
by a separate  tax  law  which  take  granted  concessions  and  royalties  into
account. At present  the  income  tax  rate  is  60%.- 8 -
stock  exchange  (SET)  are  entitled  to a  preferential  tax  rate  of 30%,  as
well as additional  benefits  with  respect  to  withholding  taxes.
Company  income  is  defined  in  a comprehensive  manner. Active
business  income,  portfolio  income  and  realized  capital  gains  are  aggregated
to  arrive  at the  total. Interest  and  rental  income  is therefore  fully
taxable. Inter-company  dividends  are  entitled  to  more favorable  treatment 3
in recognition  of potential  double-taxation  of income  flows  from  one
company  to  another. In  particular,  half  of the  dividends  received  from  a
local  company  may  be excluded. If paid  by a registered  (SET)  company,  the
dividends  are  fully  tax-exempt.  Capital  gains  are  fully  taxable  upon
realization  if they  arise  from  the  shares  of other  companies,  but  exempt
when arising  from  the  company's  own  shares. Immevable  properties,  whether
or  not  connected  to an active  business,  give  rise  to taxable  capital  gains
upon realization.
Active  business  income  is  determined  on the  basis  of the  separate
accounti-  v  approach  whereby  each  company  in  a corporate  group  is taxed  as
an indiv.iual  entity. Pricing  among  related  companies  is  expected  to
follow  the  arm's  length  standard. A fair  market  value,  or a reasonable
value  that  might  prevail  among  un:-elated  parties,  may  be used.  At present
no formula  apportioning  of international  income  has  been contemplated.
Apart  from  current  operating  expenses  such  ~_a  labor  and  leasing
expenditures,  the  following  deductions  are  allowed:
(i)  Cauital  allowance. Tax  depreciation  is  based  on  historical  cost
with  no inflation  adjustments.  Maximum  rates  of allowable
depreciation  are  20%  for  machineries  and  5% for  structures,  both  under
i.  The  special  treatment  for  inter-company  dividends  is  not  applicable  when
they  constitute  15%  or more  of the  company's  pre-tax  income.-9-
the  straight-line  method. Companits  are  required  to  ensure  that  tax
and  book  depreciation  allowances  conform  with  each  other. 4
(ii) Interest  expenses. Actual  interest  costs  of financing  are  fully
deductible,  except  for  loans  extended  by a foreign  parent  company  to a
local  branch. This restriction  does  not  apply,  however,  to loans
extended  by a foreign  company  to a controlled  local  subsidiary.
Unlike  many  of its  capital  exporters,  Thailand  has  no rules  for
curbing  thin  capitalization.  The  absence  of such  rules  makes  it
possible  for  highly  leveraged  foreign  affiliates  to reduce  taxes  in
Thailand  and  pay  more  taxes  or use  up foreign  tax  credit  at  home.
(iii)  Loss  carry-over.  Business  losses  may  be carried  for  five  years
with  no interest  and  inflation  adjustments.
b.  Indirect  Taxes
Two  major  indirect  taxes  are  of particular  importance:
(i)  Import  Duties. This tax  covers  most  of imported  articles
including  intermediate  goods  and  machineries.  Most  items  fall  within
the  range  of 5% to 50%  tax  rates,  with  an average  of about  20%.  The
rates  are therefore  relatively  high  by the  standards  of industrial
countries,  but they  are  regarded  by the  authorities  as  an instrument
for  providing  necessary  protection  for  local  industries.  They  also
provide  safeguards  against  overinvoicing,  which  would  reduce  the
domestic  income-tax  base.  Temporary  duty  exemptions  or  reductions  are
provided  for  selected  projects  by the  BOI.
§/ The effectiveness  of this  provision  depends  on the  standards  used  by the
accounting  profession  to ensure  such  conformity.  A cap  on depreciation
deduction  is  used to  limit  the  ability  of companies  to  avoid  company
taxation  by setting  book  depreciation  rates  to  high.- 10  -
(ii)  Business  Tax.  This  is  a turnover  tax  collected  on
intermediate  goods  and  final  products  with  no credit  given. It covers
both imports  and  domestic  goods  at the  same  rates. After  years  of
complaints  made  by manufacturers  and  exporters,  the  government  has
decided  to replace  the  business  tax  by a value  added  tax  (VAT),  to  be
introduced  in 1990. The  new  VAT  would  be of the  consumption-type,  which
allows  a credit  equal  to the  taxes  paid  on iatermediate  and  capital
goods. It  would  have  comprehensive  coverage,  excluding  only  the
financial  sector,  and  a  high threshold  for  registration,  which  leaves
out  small  firms  in  all  sectors.
2.  Non-Resident  Withholding  Tax (NWT)
Upon repatriation  of investment  income  out  of the  country,  a
non-resident  withholding  tax  applies. This  tax  serves  several  purposes.
First,  it  generates  revenue  at little  economic  cost  if the  tax  is fully
credited  against  foreign  taxes. Second,  it is  a  bargaining  device  in
treaty  negotiations.  The  NWT  can  also  work  against  the  interest  of the
host  country,  however. If,  for  instance,  the  NWT raises  the  host country's
total  tax  rate (company  and  withholding  taxes  taken  together)  above  that  of
a capital  exporting  country  and if  the  excess  foreign  tax  credit  resulting
therefrom  is  not  applicable  against  other  taxes  levied  by the  home country,
then  the  host  country  becomes  less  attractive.
The  rates  of NWT in  Thailand  are  highly  uneven. First,  they  vary
across  types  of income,  with the  items  deductible  at the  company  stage  such
as interest  expenses  being  taxed  somewhat  more  heavily  under  the  NWT.
Second,  the  rates  are  reduced  on  all types  of income  for  treaty  partners.
Third,  the  rates  also  vary  according  to  the  recipient  of the  income  being
remitted,  with distinctions  made  between  individuals  and  companies,  between- 11  -
financial  institutions  and  other  companies. Fourth,  the  degree  of
ownership  in the  Thai  operations  can  also  affect  the  NWT  rates. Often,
25%  control  of the  voting  stocks  in  a  manufacturing  company  qualifies  the
foreign  investor  for  a lower  NWT  tax  rate.
Normally,  the  host  country  can  apply  a  different  NWT  rate  to each
capital-exporting  country. This  practice  is  well  accepted,  and  not
regarded  as discriminatory,  since  company  tax  rates  in  the  home  countries
are  generally  unequal. The following  structure  of NWT  rates  is  currently
in  place:
a.  Branch  Profits
Branches  of foreign  companies  are  taxed  in  Thailand  at the  standard
comparny  tax  rate (35%),  with  no interest  deduction  for  the  loans  extended
by the  parents. The  home  country  of the  parents,  however,  may  allow  a
consolidation  of any  losses  incurred  by a foreign  branch  with the  income  of
the  parent. When the  profits  are  being  transferred  abroad,  an additional
remittance  tax  of 20%  applies  to "net-of-tax"  profits. Because  of the  way
the  tax  is computed,  however,  tax  liability  is  only  16.7%  of the  gross-of-
tax  profits  submitted  for  repatriation. 5
b.  Dividends
Ordinarily  the  NWT  on dividends  is  20%.  Some  treaty  partners,
particularly  those  exempting  foreign-source  income,  however,  have  received
preferential  rates. The  Netherlands,  for  instance,  has  a reduced  rate  of
10%  if the  affiliate  in Thailand  engages  in  manufacturing  and  if the  parent
holds  at least  25%  of the  voting  shares. For  France,  the  rate is  15%  when
EJ Suppose  a company  proposes  to remit  x - 100  unit,  and  the  after-tax
amount  actually  remitted  is  y,  with the  remittance  tax  - x-y.  The law
requires  that (x-y)/y  - 0.2,  which  implies  that  y - 83.3  and  thus  x-y  -
16.7.12 -
the  same  conditions  are  met.  The  NWT  is  exempted  altogether  if  the
dividends  are  distributed  by a company  under  the  tax  holiday  program  of the
BOI.
c.  Capital  Gains
The standard  NWT  is 25%  on capital  gains  being  remitted  abroad.
The  rate,  however,  may  be reduced  to 12.5%  or exempted  altogether  for
treaty  partners. Of the  current  22 treaty  partners,  this  tax  is  exempted
in  most  cases  and  remains  at 25%  for  5  countries.
d.  Interest
The standard  NWT  is 25%. The  rate  remains  unchanged,  for  most
treaty  partners,  but certain  concessions  are  made.  First,  interest  paid  to
a financial  institution  abroad  is subject  to 10%  withholding  tax  rate.
Second,  interest  accruing  to a government  agency  abroad  is  exempt  from  tax.
e.  Royalties.  Management  Fees  and  Technical  Service  Fees
The  standard  rate  of  NWT is 25%,  although  some  deductions  are
alloiwed  for  the  actual  expenses  incurred. Treaty  provisions  may  lower  the
rates  for  some  narrowly  defined  activities  to 5%  or 15%.
B.  Taxation  by Countries  of Residence
The  host  country  seldom  has  exclusive  tax  jurisdiction  over  the
income  earned  by a foreign  affiliate. The  home  country  of the  parent  plays
an important  role. Although  the  source  country  has  the  first  opportunity  to
tax,  the  residence  country  determines  the  ultimate  tax  burden. For
instance,  a tax  collected  at source  may  or  may  not  be recognized  at  home,
thus  the  relief  of double  taxation  may  or  may  not  operate. An incentive
granted  by the  source  country  may  be reduced  or  cancelled  by an increase  in
the  residence  country's  tax.  To achieve  its  own  policy  objectives,  the
capital-importing  country  cannot  ignore  the  tax  rules  prevailing  in the
capital  exporting  countries.- 13 -
The rules  governing  foreign-source  income  are  generally  complex  and
vary from  one  capital  exporting  country  to  another. It is  not the  objective
cf this  section  to  present  and  discuss  the  detailed  tax  laws  for  each  of
Thailand's  capital  exporters.  A few  basic  and  strategic  principles,
however,  cut  across  national  practices  and  are  summarized  below:
1.  The  Source  vs.  Residence  Princiole
When the  source  principle  is followed,  only  the  income  originating
from  domestic  sources  is taxed: foreign-source  income  is  exempt. The
residence  principle,  by contrast,  calls  for  taxation  of a  resident's  income
on a global  basis. When  this  principle  is  used,  a mechanism  is  needed  to
relieve  foreign-source  income  from  double  taxation. A common  relief  method
is the  use of foreign  tax  credit,  whicn  reduces  the  home  country's  tax  by
the  amount  of  eligible  taxes  paid  abroad. Another  method  allows  foreign
taxes  to  be deducted  from  the  home  country's  taxable  income.
Few  countries,  however,  follow  any  one  principle  strictly. Hong
Kong  is one  of the  few. It applies  the  source  rule  consistently,  and  thus
avoids  double  taxation  of foreign-source  income  without  resorting  to  any
relief  procedures. The  United  States  is  another  example. It follows  the
residence  rule  to a large  extent  and  uses  the  foreign  tax  credit. The
United  States,  however,  does  tax  non-residents  on their  U.S.  source  income,
and thus  departs  from  a strict  requirement  of the  residence  principle. Most
countries  specify  the  taxpayer's  circumstances  and  the  types  of  income  under
which  each  of the  principles  applies. In  general,  and  apart  from  the  case
of  Hong  Kong,  it is  not  possiblo  co  identify  a country  either  with the
source  or the  residence  principle.
2.  Deferral  vs.  Accrual  Taxation
When  a resident's  global  income  is taxed  at  home,  the  foreign-source
component  may  be taxed  when  received  by the  resident  (the  deferral  method)- 14 -
or  when earned  abroad  (the  accrual  method),  both  with  a credit  given  for  the
foreign  taxes  paid.  This  distinction  is  of  considerable  importance  when  the
tax  rates  differ  significantly  between  the  host  and the  home countries.  The
deferral  method  is  more attractive  to the  taxpayer  when  the  source-country
tax  is  relatively  low. The  advantage  of deferral  arises  from  the  taxpayer's
opportunity  to  make  use  of the  deferred  tax,  which  is  essentially  an
interest-free  loan.
Foreign-source  income  of subsidiaries  is  normally  taxed  on a
deferral  basis. Accrual  taxation  applies  under  more  limited  circumstances.
An important  case  of accrual  taxation  relates  to the  income  of foreign
branches,  an option  of choice  for  many  financial  companies.  A foreign
branch,  moreover,  is often  set  up for  the  first  few  years  of commercial
operations  when losses  are  expected. Accrual  taxation  of branches  allows
the  parent  company  to  write  off  the  current  losses  abroad  against  local
income. Another  example  of accrual  taxation  refers  to the  income  of a
controlled  foreign  affiliate  in  a tax  haven. This  type  of income  is the
main concern  of the  United  States'  well  known  Subpart  F regulations.
3.  Active  vs. Passive  Income
Many countries  draw  a distinction  between  active  and  passive  forms
of income. Active  income  refers  to the  yields  of productive  activities,  as
with  direct  foreign  investment.  Passive  income  is the  return  to portfolio
investment  or property  income. The  distinction  is  not  always  clear-cut.  At
times  an arbitrary  line  is  drawn. For  example,  when the  ownership  in  a
foreign  operating  subsidiary  is  greater  than  10%  or 25%,  depending  on the
home  country's  law,  the  income  arising  therefrom  is  considered  active. When
ownership  falls  below  the  specified  level,  the  resulting  income  is
considered  as passive.
Active  business  income  is  normally  given  preferential  treatment.
Most  European  nations,  for  instance,  exempt  active  business  income  arising- 15 -
from  foreign  sources,  but tax  passive  income  on a deferral  basis  with  a
foreign  tax  credit. Some  countries  allow  a foreign  tax  credit  only  with
respect  to active  business  income;  the  deduction  method  applies  to  other
forms  of income. Preferential  treatment  is a relative  concept;  in  this  case
it  refers  to  the  comparison  of tax  rules  across  different  forms  of income  in
one  country.
Thailand  offers  tax  incentives  for  both  active  and  portfolio
investments. Incentives  for  active  investment  are  administered  by the  Board
of Investment  and  those  for  portfolio  investment  by the  Security  Exchange  of
Thailand. Each  type  of incentives  can  be cancelled  by the  action  of the
home  country  unless  a tax  sparing  provision  is included  in  the  relevant  tax
treaty. If Thailand  wishes  to  protect  all  of its  incentive  programs,
however,  different  provisions  must  be sought  for  active  and  passive  income.
Consider  a residence  country  that  exempts  active  business  income  and  taxes
passive  income  with a foreign  tax  credit. A tax  sparing  provision  is  not
necessary  to  protect  the  BOI's  tax  holidays,  but it is  very  much  needed  to
protect  the  SET's  incentives.
Each  country  of residence  has its  own  mix  of the  various  rules
discussed  above. No two  countries  are  exactly  alike. An interesting  case
study  is  West  Germany. Foreign-source  income  is taxed  in  West  Germany
according  to the  residence  principle  when  the  source  country  is  not  a treaty
partner. When a treaty  exists,  active  business  income  is  tax  exempt  in  West
Germany  according  to the  source  principle,  but  passive  income  remains
subject  to tax. Among  the  passive  income  arising  from  a treaty  partner,  the
deferral  method  is  used  when ownership  is  equal  to  or less  than  10%
(ordinary  foreign  affiliates),  but  accrual  taxation  applies  when  ownership
exceeds  25% (controlled  foreign  affiliates).- 16 -
4.  Examoles of Residence-Country  Taxation
Table 1 shows the  ways dividends and branch Rrofits are taxed.  As
is evident, each country employs a different method, depending on the types
of income, degrees of ownership and organizational forms, among others.  It
is therefore not possible to associate any one country with any particular
rule or principle.  The diversity increases as more categories of income are
considered (see  below).
TABLE 1  Residence Countrv Taxation of Dividends and
Profits Arising from Thailand
Source Rule  Residence Rule
(Exemption)  Credit with  Credit with
Deferral  Accural
Hong Kong  Japan (S)  Japan (B)
Germany (IT, PI)  Germany (B)
Netherlands (IT, PI)
France (ABI)  United Kingdom (S)  United Kingdom (B)
Germany (ABI)  France (IT,  PI)
Netherlands (ABI)  United States (S)  United States (B)
Switzerland  Taiwan (S)  Taiwan (B)
Singapore (S)  Singapore (B)
Sources:  Price Waterhouse (1986) and Individual Tax Treaties.
Notes:  ABI - Active Business Income
B  - Branch Profits
CFA - Controlled Foreign Affiliates
IT - International  Transport
PI - Passive Income
TP - Trpaty Partner
NTP - Non-Treaty Partner
S  - Subsidiary
In Table 2, the tax rules governing interest income in  various
countries are shown.  Although most countries apply the residence rule with
foreign tax credit, there is considerable  variation arising from the
definition of tax base and the limit for tax relief.  Other forms of- 17 -
portfolio income as well as royalties and management fees are subject to
similar tax treatment.
TABLE 2  Residence-Country Taxation of Thai-Source Interest Income
Taxable  Relief  Limits on  Treaty with
Country  Base  Method  Relief  Thailand
France  Gross  Credit  No Limit  Yes
Hong Kong  Exempt  Exempt  N.A.  No
Germany (West)  Gross  Credit  Home Tax on  Yes
the Interest
Japan  Gross  Credit  Home Country Tax  Yes
on the  Relevant
Income
Netherlands  Gross  Credit  Home Tax on  Yes
the Interest
United Kingdom  Gross  Credit  Home Tax on  Yes
the Interest
United States  Gross  Credit  No limit  No
Sources:  Julian Alsworth, Chapter 4.
C.  Tax Treaties
A net capital importer, Thailand regards tax treaties primarily as an
instrument for attracting foreign investment.  Through tax treaties, the Thai
government conveys to potential investors a clear set of tax rules, as well as
a sense of stability, since any changes in the treaty  provisions can only be
accomplished by a bilateral agreement conducted under established procedures.
The Thai government also seeks to ensure through tax treaties that the- 18  -
incentive  measures  it implements  are  not  nullified  or substantially  weakened  by
actions  of the  home countries.
A wide range  of income  is  entitled  to  tax  incentives  in  Thailand,
including  active  business  profits  as  well  as passive  and  portfolio  earnings.
Each  type  of income,  however,  is subject  to  a different  method  of relief  from
double  taxation  when remitted  to the  home country. Many countries  employ  the
credit  method  as the  principal  tax  relief  procedure. (The  meclanics  of this
method  is  outlined  above.) Normally  the  credit  method  implies  that  a reduction
or exemption  received  in  Thailand  gives  rise  to  an equal  tax  increase  in  the
home  country. Thus,  a  tax  holiday  in  Thailand  could  result  in  a transfer  of
revenue  from  Thailand  to  the  home  country. Moreover,  the  benefits  intended  for
the  investors  would  not  materialize.
Thailand  has  attempted  to  prevent  the  transfer  of revenue  out  of the
country  without  giving  up the  incentive  programs. When the  home  country  uses
the  exemption  method  for  double-taxation  relief,  as  with  most  western  European
countries,  no particular  issues  arise. But  where  the  credit  method  is  used,
Thailand  normally  requires  a tax-sparing  provision  to  be included  in the
treaty. Tax  sparing  means  that  any  taxes  spared  or exempted  in  Thailand  are
given  full  credit  in the  home country. Most  of the  countries  that  export
capital  to  Thailand  have agreed  to  the  tax-sparing  condition,  with  the
exception  of the  United  States,  the  second  largest  capital  exporter  to
Thailand. The  United  States,  which  has  not  ratified  any  treaty  with the  tax-
sparing  clause  since  1963,  therefore  does  not  currently  have a double  taxation
agreement  with Thailand. (See  Tables  2  and  3).
Apart  from  the  issue  of tax  sparing,  Thailand  is  also  concerned  about
potential  revenue  losses  arising  from  other  treaty  provisions.  Under  the
United  Nation's  Model  of Double  Taxation  Convention,  the  concept  of  a taxable
entity  (called  permanent  establishment)  is  somewhat  narrower  than  provided  by- 19  -
TABLE 3  Thailand's Treaty Partners. Tax Relief
Methods and Tax Sparing
Principle Method of  Tax Sparing
Country  Relief for Double Taxation  Clause
1.  Austria  ocl  Yes
2.  Belgium  Ep2 Yes
3.  Canada3 OC, EP  Yes
4.  China  OC  Yes
5.  Denmark  Ep2 No
6.  Finland  OC  Yes
7.  France  EP  No
8.  Germany  OC, EP  No
9.  India  OC  Yes
10.  Indonesia  OC  Yes
11.  Italy  OC  Yes
12.  Japan  OC  Yes4
13.  Korea  OC  No
14.  Malaysia  OC  Yes
15.  Netherlands  EP  No
16.  Norway  EP  No
17.  Pakistan  OC  Yes
18.  Philippines  OC  Yes
19.  Poland  OC  No
20.  Romania  N.A.  N.A.
21.  Singapore  OC  Yes
22.  Sweden  EP  No5
23.  United Kingdom  OC  Yes
Footnotes:
1.  OC - Ordinary Credit
2.  EP - Exemption with progression
3.  Active business income from foreign sources is exempted in Canada.
4.  Tax sparing applied only to a 1962 Incentive  Act, but not the
subsequent and current one.  The treaty is being rer.gotiated.
5.  Sweden applies the tax credit method only to royalty income and
tax sparing is provided in the treaty.- 20 -
the  Thai  tax  code. By adopting  the  United  Nation's  definition,  some  of the
existing  taxpayers  would  no longer  be subject  to tax. Tax  deductions  are  also
more  liberal  under  the  U.N.  convention  than  the  Thai  tax  code. Moreover,  many
of the  withholding  taxes  for  treaty  partners  are  set  lower  than  Thailand's
standard  rates. For  instance,  the  dividend  NWT  is reduced  from  20%  to 15% (or
10%)  in some  cases,  interest  from  25%  to 20%  and  the  royalty  tax  from  20%  to
TABLE  4
Shares  of Investment
Treaty  Status  Jan-Sep.
Country  1986  1987  1988(p)
Japan  Renegotiated  44.32  69.38  48.54
United  States  No  18.80  16.87  11.47
United  Kingdom  Yes  3.56  6.98  3.40
West  Germany  Yes  2.33  9.51  1.71
France  Yes  1.32  2.82  1.24
Netherlands  Yes  (0.84)  1.58  1.11
Italy  Yes  1.15  0.15  0.16
Canada  Yes  0.53  0.24  0.21
Australia  No  2.09  0.55  0.18
Hong  Kong  No  13.69  (36.55)  10.92
Singapore  Yes  5.86  (4.68)  6.07
Malaysia  Yes  0.11  (0.20)  0.05
Philippines  Yes  (0.86)  0.01  0.01
Taiwan  Nol  1.92  14.59  10.66
Others  .. 6.03  18.75  4.32
100.00  100.00  100.00
Source: Bank  of Thailand,  May  15,  1989,  for  the  share  of direct
investment.  Revenue  Department  for  treaty  status.
J/  Thailand  does  not  have  a separate  tax  treaty  with  Taiwan,  although
it does  with the  People's  Republic  of China.- 21  -
These  sources  of  potential  revenue  loss  are  weighed  against  the
improvement  in investment  climate  made  possible  by tax  treaties. The  Thai
authorities  clearly  recognize  the  advantages  of  having  soz--mihat  lower  tax
rates  as  well as a stable  and  articulated  set  of rules. The  balance  of the
various  considerations  appears  to  favor  the  presence  of treaties. 'Thus,
with the  notable  exception  of the  United  States,  Hong  Kong and  Taiwan,
Thailand  has  successfully  concluded  treaty  negotiations  with  all the  major
capital  exporters. (See  Table  4).- 22 -
III.  IMPACT  OF TAXATION  ON  MULTINATIONALS'  FINANCING
AND INVESTMENT  DECISIONS
Our  empirical  analysis  in  this  section  is  based  on the  theoretical
model  developed  in  Annex  I.  This  model  describes  a  multinational  firm  that
maximizes  the  value  of its  equity  investment  in  a Thai  subsidiary.  The
subsidiary  finances  investment  with only  retentions  or  debt 6 so that  there
is  a one-to-one  relationship  between  the  ratio  of dividend  to interest
remittances  and  the  debt-equity  ratio  of the  subsidiary.  Firms  that  rely
more  on debt  finance  remit  more  interest  and  less  dividends. Debt  may  be
raised  in  Thailand  or in the  home countries.
The taxes  paid  by subsidiaries  are  company  and  withholding  taxes  as
surveyed  in  the  previous  section. We do not  include  Thai  business  taxes
since  the  expected  reform  measures  (consumption-based  VAT)  will eliminate
the  tax imposed  on  capital  goods. Import  duties  on capital  goods,  in
principle,  should  be included  in the  measure  of the  user  cost  of  capital.
However,  since  we have  no country-specific  data,  the  inclusion  of  a single
measure  of the  import  duty  tax  rate  on  capital  goods  does  not  allow  for
much  variation  in the  user  cost  of capital  across  firms  with  different
ownership.
bj  We do  not  model  equity  transfers  made  by the  parent  to the  subsidiary
although  the  model  can  be easily  extended  to  allow  for  this  form  of
financing. With  transfers,  the  Thai  withholding  tax  on  dividends  is
relevant  to  measuring  the  cost  of finance  for  the  subsidiary  rather  than
the  capital  gains  tax,  which  affects  the  cost  of finance  associated  with
retentions.  The  effect  of the  Thai  tax  on dividends  ultimately  depends
on the  home  country's  tax  on foreign-source  income. If the  home country
exempts  foreign-source  income,  the  cost  of finance  for  new  equity
transfers  depends  on the  Thai  dividend  tax  rather  than  the  capital  gains
tax. If the "deferral"  or "accrual"  method  is  used,  the  cost  of  new
equity  finance  does  not  depend  on the  Thai  withholding  tax  since  the  tax
is credited  against  taxes  levied  by the  home country  on foreign-source
income.- 23 -
The  Thai  company  income  tax  provisions  included  in  our  calculations
below  are  as follows: First,  we examine  foreign  companies  operating  as
non-SET  firms  (up  to 100%  ownership),  facing  a company  tax  rate  of 35%,  and
SET  firms  (less  than  50%  ownership),  facing  a company  tax  rate  of 30%. We
do not include  tax  holiday  firms  owned  by foreign  companies. 7 Withholding
tax  rates  also  vary since  SET  companies  can  remit  dividends  and  capital
gains  abroad  without  paying  Thai  withholding  taxes.  Second,  we assume  that
companies  use tax  depreciation  allowances  that  conform  with  book
depreciation.  As remarked  in the  previous  section,  companies  may  try  to
use  higher  book  depreciation  figures  to  maximize  their  tax  allowances  even
though  true  economic  depreciation  is  much  lower. Third,  interest  costs
associated  with either  offshore  or local  debt  are  deductible  from  Thai
corporate  taxable  income  although  interest  on offshore  debt  is subject  to
Thai  withholding  taxes.
The  capital-exporting  countries  selected  for  this  study  provided
the  bulk  of direct  foreign  investment  for  Thailand,  as shown  in  Table  4.
Some  of the  countries,  such  as Hong  Kong,  fully  exempt  foreign-source
income.  Others  exempt  remitted  dividends  and  retained  profits  of
subsidiaries  in  Thailand  (Netherlands,  Switzerland,  France  and,  for
qualifying  ownership  of 10%,  West  Germany). Moreover,  several  countries
tax  remitted  earnings  of subsidiaries  and  provide  a tax  credit  for  the
underlying  corporate  income  and  withholding  taxes  (Japan,  Singapore,
Taiwan,  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States). Almost  all  countries
2/  Tax  holidays  have  been analyzed  by Mintz (1989)  for  five  countries
including  Thailand.  The  model  used  in the  analysis  is  applicable  to
domestic  firms  or foreign  affiliates  where  the  home  countries  exempt
foreign-source  income. The  regimes  of  deferral  and  accrual  taxation
have  not  been incorporated.- 24 -
tax  branch  profits  on an accrual  basis,  except  for  the  Netherlands,
Switzerland,  and  Hong  Kong.
In  our  analysis,  we examine  several  cases  of  home  country  taxation.
Those  countries  that  exempt  foreign-source  equity  income  of subsidiaries
and  branches  are  assured  to  be "exempt"  cases  only.  Countries  that  exempt
equity  income  of subsidiaries  but  not  branches  are  assumed  to  be either
"exempt"  or "accrual"  taxation  cases  only. Countries  that  tax  remitted
earnings  of the  subsidiary  and  accrual  earnings  of  branches  are  assumed  to
be either  "exempt",  "deferral"  or "accrual"  cases. The  "exempt"  case  also
applies  to companies  resident  in  countries  that  tax  foreign-source  income
on a deferral  basis  if these  companies  have  excess  foreign  tax  credits  that
cannot  be used against  other  tax  liabilities. 8
Table  5  provides  the  data  used later  to  measure  the  user cost  of
capital  and  marginal  effective  tax  rate,  which  is  explained  in  more  detail
below.
The  model  presented  in  Annex  I also  considers  the  impact  of interest
rates  and inflation,  which  vary  across  countries,  on the  investment  and
financing  costs  of multinationals  of different  origins. The  determination  of
L/  As discussed  in  Appendix  I, the  taxation  of foreign-source  income  on a
deferral  basis  does  not apply  if  the  parent  corporation  does  not  pay  any
taxes  to  the  home  country  on  all  forms  of  remitted  earnings.  In  this
case,  the  firm,  with  excess  foreign  tax  credits,  is  not  able  to  use
them.  Hines  and  Hubbard  (1988)  found  that  a  number  of  U.S.  corporations
in 1984  were  in  an excess  foreign  tax  credit  position  although  they  had
no evidence  to suggest  that  such  a position  would  be permanent.
Moreover,  from  a tax  planning  point  of  view,  a parent  corporation  with
excess  foreign  tax  credits  would  want to restructure  its  relationship
with the  subsidiary  so that  the  subsidiary  pays  less  company  tax  to
Thailand  and  the  parent  pays  more  corporate  tax  to  the  home  country  so
foreign  tax  credits  can  be used  up.Table  5  Values  of  Parameters  Used  to  Measure  tJrer  Costs  of  Capital  and  Effective  Tax
Ratea  for  Companies  ODerstint  in  Thailand.  Domestic  and  Foreign  OwnershiT
CorDOrate  Tax  Rate  Capital  Cost  Accrual-Equivalent  Dividend  Subsidiary
Domestic  Foreign  Allowance  Rate  Capital  Gains  Tax  Payout  Debt-Asset  Interest  Inflation
3
Country  Income  (2'  Income  (2)  (D  Balance  Equivalent  (2)  Rate  on Parent  (2)  Ratio  (2)  Ratio  (2)  Rate (2)  Rate  (2)
Thailand  30,  35  35  10  15  12.5  3.9
Hong  Kong  18  0  10  8  53.9  34.0  10.0  7.4
Taivan  25  25  10  8  47.8  57.4  10.5  4.5
United  States  38  38  13.6  13  48.0  42.5  9.3  4.0
United  Kingdom  35  25  15.5  12  43.5  43.1  10.3  4.9
West  Germany  56  0,  50,  561  10  6  70.5  95.5  8.3  1.2
Japan  58  532  10  19  39.6  66.1  4.9  0.7
Singapore  33  33  12.6  4  43.5  28.2  6.0  1.5
Netherlands  42  0  10  4  36.8  38.8  7.8  0.7
Switzerlands  30  30  18.6  4  4R.0  50.7  5.2  1.9
France  42  0  10  4  48.0  50.7  9.5  2.7
Sources Socmhai  Richupan  and  International  Bureau  of  Fiscal  Documentation.
1O2  applies  to dividends  for  qualifying  ownership  in subsidiary,  502  for  branches,  562  otherwise.
2Corporate  lncome  plus  enterprise  tax.
31ased  on  1988  conuoer price  Index.- 26 -
the  exchange  rate  between  Thailand  and  other  countriis  is  very important  to
the  modelling  of the  effect  of taxes  on the  multinational's  decisions. The
model  uses the  "purchasing  power  parity"  as a determination  of exchange
rates. That is,  the  value  of  home country  currency  relative  to the  Thai
currency,  the  Baht,  is  determined  by ratio  of the  home country  consumer  price
index  to the  Thai consumer  price  index. Several  studies  have suggested  that
currency  valuation,  at least  in  the  short  term,  is  not accurately  predicted
by "purchasing  power  parity". However,  the  model  examined  in the  Annex  is
based  on long  term  considerations  since  investment  '  inherently  a long  term
decision. 'Purchasing-power  parity"  is  an appropriate  characterization  of
currency  valuation  for  this  purpose.
This section  is  divided  into  two  parts. In  part (A),  we examine  the
impact  of taxes  on the  financing  decisions  of  multinationals.  This  analysis
will depend  on the  type  of model  assumed  for  the  determination  of financial
equilibrium,  a  point  that  we discuss  in  more  detail  below.  In  part (B),  we
examine  the impact  of taxes  on the  multinational's  investment  decisions. We
first  measure  the  user  cost  of  capital  which  is the  tax-adjusted  costs  of
financing  and  depreciation  faced  by the  firm  when  choosing  its  capital  stock.
We then  measure  the  effective  tax  which  is  the  difference  between  the  gross-
of-tax  marginal  rate  of return  on capital  (user  cost  of capital  net  of
depreciation)  and  the  net-of-tax  marginal  rate  of  return  earned  by owners  of
capital. The  marginal  effective  tax  rate  is then  measured  as the  effective
tax  divided  by the  gross-of-tax  marginal  rate  of return  on capital. 9 Since
i/ There  are  alternative  measures  such  as the  effective  tax  divided  by the
net-of-tax  rate  of return  on capital. We choose  the  former  since  it is
comparable  with the  original  studies  such  as King  and  Fullerton  (1984)  and
Boadway,  Bruce  and  Mintz (1984).- 27 -
we will  be allowing  for  three  types  of financial  arbitrage,  as explained  more
fully  below,  we measure  the  user  cost  of capital  and  effective  tax  rate  for
each  case.
A.  Financing  Decisions
A crucial  issue  in  discussing  the  impact  of taxation  on
multinational  decisions  is  that  of financial  arbitrage. Differences  in tax
rates  across  countries  and  sources  of income  make it  very difficult  to
fully  model  a financial  equilibrium  whereby  savers  earn  the  same  net-of-tax
rates  of returns  on assets  and  firms  face  the  same  gross-of-tax  costs  on
all  sources  of finance. In  a  multinational  context,  a financial
equilibrium  would  need to  account  for  the  following  differences:
(-)  Treaty  Shopping. As a result  of differences  among  countries
with  respect  to  withholding  and  corporate  tax  provisions,  multinationals
minimize  taxes  by routing  income  through  countries  with the  lowest  levels
of taxation  on  particular  sources  of income. An important  example  of this
is  the  Netherlands  which  negotiates  the  lowest  withholding  tax  rate  on
income  with  host countries,  including  Thailand. The  Netherlands  allows
interest  and  dividend  remittances  to flow  tax-free  through  a  Dutch
subsidiary.  If the  multinational  does  not  want to  repatriate  the  income
back to the  resident  country,  it  can  distribute  the  funds  as interest  to a
Swiss  branch  of the  Dutch  subs-idiary.  The  Swiss  branch  is  taxed  at  a
minimal  rate. 10 In this  manner,  a foreign  company  can  defer  taxes  owing  to
the  home country  and,  at the  same  time,  repatriate  funds  out  of Thailand  to
a desired  destination.  Arbitrage  under  "treaty  shoppinv6 s.  particularly
IO/  Some  countries,  like  the  United  States,  might  tax  this  passive  income
earned  by the  Dutch  subsidiary  on an  accrual  basis. However,  if the
U.S.  multinational  _'ructures  the  transaction  carefully  the income  may
not trigger  a U.S.  tax.- 28 -
difficult  to  model  in  detail  since  there  are  many tax  planning
opportunities  available  to  multinational  companies.
(ii)  Restructuring  Measures. A mualtinational  can  minimize  taxes
by restructuring  the  financing  of its  subsidiary.  For  example,  if  the
parent  has  excess  foreign  tax  credits,  it  can  restructure  the  subsidiary's
liabilities  in  favor  of  debt  since  interest  is tax  deductible.  This  lowers
the  tax  paid to  the  host  country,  and  thereby  reduces  the  excess  foreign
tax  credits. If  the  subsidiary's  interest  also  accrues  to  the  parent,  the
parent  will generate  more  home  country  tax  liability  on interest  income  (to
the  extent  that  the  home  country's  corporate  tax  on income  is  more  than  the
withholding  tax  imposed  on remittances  by the  host  country)  and this
liability  can  be used to  absorb  more  of the  excess  foreign  tax  credits.
The  same  consideration  applies  to technical  and  management  assistance  fees,
royalties,  and  lease  payments,  all  of which  are  deductible  expenses  for
calculating  the  host country's  corporate  tax.
(iii)  Timing  Differences.  A multinational  can  reduce  tax
liabilities  over  time  by manipulating  the  payment  of corporate  taxes  to the
host and  home  governments.  The "rhythm"  method  is  a term  coined  for
strategies  used  by companies  to  take  advantage  of the  "deferral"  method
used  by many  countries  to tax  foreign-source  income. A company  can  try  to
avoid  the  payment  of taxes  to  the  home  country  by reinvesting  profits  in
the  subsidiary.  No tax  payable  to the  home  country  is triggered  since  the
home  country  taxes  only  remitted  income. If the  multinational  wishes  to
repatriate  earnings,  either  for  financing  or taxll  reasons,  it then
generates  the  highest  possible  tax  in the  host country  in  the  year  of
11  For  example,  if the  parent  wishes  to  generate  excess  foreign  tax
credits  on dividend  remittances  to  eliminate  home  country  taxes  owing
on other  remitted  income,  repatriation  will occur  just  for  this  reason
alone.- 29 -
repatriation  to minimize  taxes  paid  to the  home  country. This  can  be
achieved  by having  the  subsidiary  sell  off  assets  (and  generate  taxes  paid
to the  host  country)  or,  if some  deductions  under  the  host  country's  tax
law  are  discretionary,  choose  not to  use  all  company  tax  writeoffs
(delaying  them  for  future  years  when  repatriation  is  not  planned). Host
country  taxes  are  thereby  increased  in  years  of repatriation  and  reduced  in
years  of profit  reinvestment.  Recent  U.S.  tax  reforms,  requiring  the
pooling  of earnings  over  time  to calculate  the  foreign  tax  credit,
specifically  aimed  at the  use  of the  "rhythm"  method,  although  the
incentive  to  defer  taxes  by reinvestinig  profits  still  remains.
These  three  methods  used to  minimize  taxes  are  difficult  to  capture
in a single  model. The  model  represented  in  Annex  I assists  in  analyzing
'restructuring"  and,  to  a limited  extent,  "treaty  shopping". There  is  no
attempt  to  model  the  "rhythm"  method  nor  all  the  complexities  that  would
arise  from  "treaty  shopping".
In this  section,  we show  what  potential  biases  in  financing  are
induced  by the  tax  system. For  this  purpose,  we calculate  the  cost  of debt
finance  raised  locally  in  Thailand,  the  opportunity  cost  of  equity  invested
in the  subsidiary,  and  the  cost  of debt  financed  raised  by the
multinational  at  home. 12
Results
In  Table  6,  we present  the  real  costs  of finance  for  each  home
country  and  tax  regime  (exemption,  deferral  and  accrual). With these
numbers,  we can  observe  the  effects  of international  taxes  on the  incentive
.12  We do not  attempt  to  model  the  U.S. tax  reform  rules  that  limit  the  use
of interest  deductions  by the  parent  when  financing  investments  in the
subsidiary.  We assume  that  any  debt  finance  raised  in the  U.S. is
deductible  from  domestic-source  income.- 30  -
Table  6  Real  Cost  of  Thai  Debt.  Home  Country  Equity  and  Debt
Opportunity
Debt Issued  Cost of Equity  Cost of
in Thailand  Finance (Parent)  Debt Finance
Country  SET  Non-SET  SET  Non-SET  Issued at Home
Thailand  4.85  4.23  6.73  8.17
Hong Kong - Exemption  4.85  4.23  0.84  0.80
Taiwan - Exemption  4.85  4.23  4.15
- Deferral  4.94  4.05  5.02  4.35  4.06
- Accrual  5.48  4.90
United States - Exeinpt'on  4.85  4.23  3.66
- Deferral  4.98  4.00  4.43  4.83  2.63
- Accrual  3.85  4.80
United Kingdom - Exemption  4.85  4.23  3.58  2.71
- Deferral  3.59  2.36  5.36  5.86
- Accrual  4.32  4.74
Weat Germany - Exemption  4.85  4.23  6.66
- Accrual  1.60  5.07  2.69
Japan - Exemption  4.85  4.23  2.34
- Deferral  4.68  3.43  2.56  4.09  1.84
- Accrual  1.35  4.28
Singapore - Zxemption  4.85  4.23  3.44
- Deferral  4.43  3.32  3.75  4.12  2.69
- Accrual  4.48  3.65
Netherlands - Exemption  4.85  4.23  5.72  3.83
Switzerland - Exemption  4.85  4.23  2.38  1.74
France - Exemption  4.85  4.23  5.20  6.73
- Accrual  3.35  6.5- 31 -
to issue  finance  in  different  countries. In  each  case,  we consider  the
possibilities  of "treaty  shopping",  'restructuring"  and  "timing  differences".
The  Exemption  Case:  From  the  perspective  of "treaty  shopping",  the  least-
cost source  of equity  and  debt  finance  is in  Hong  Kong. There  are several
reasons  for  this  but the  primary  one  is  that  inflation  rates,  relative  to
interest  rates,  are  highest  in  Hong  Kong  and  Switzerland  compared  to other
countries. The  costs  of debt  finance  in  Hong  Kong and  Switzerland  are  lowest
even  though  these  countries  tax  company  income  at a relatively  low  rate.
Thailand  has rather  high  costs  of finance  primarily  as  a result  of a
restrictive  monetary  policy,  which  implies  low inflation,  high nominal
interest  rates  and  high  real  interest  rates.
With respect  to the  incentive  to restructure  financing,  we note  that
the  real  cost  of  debt financc  issued  in  Thailand  is generally  higher  than  the
real  cost  of equity  in the  exemption  case.  This  is the  case  despite  the  tax
deductibility  of interest  from  Thai  corporate  taxes  that  lowers  the  cost  of
Thai  debt  finance. Only  in the  cases  of French,  West  German  and  Thai
ownership  is  the  cost  of equity  finance  higher  than  debt finance. The  reason
is  that  most countries  have  lower  real  interest  rates  compared  to  Thailand.
Similarly,  the  cost  of debt  finance  raised  in the  home  country  is
also  higher  than  debt finance  in  Thailand  for  the  exemption  regime. This
reflects  not  only  the  differences  in  real  interest  rates  but  also  a  higher
company  tax  rate  in  most  other  countries  compared  to Thailand,  with the
exceptions  of  Hong Kong  and  Taiwan. Since  interest  writeoffs  are  more
valuable  in  other  countries,  there  is  an incentive  to issue  debt in those
countries. Note that  Taiwan  has  a lower  company  tax  rate  than  Thailand  but
its  interest  rate,  adjusted  for  inflation,  is lower  than  in  Thailand.
As stressed  above  these  results  are  contingent  on anticipated  rates
of inflation. If  real  interest  rates  are  the  same  across  countries,- 32  -
multinational  companies  from  exemption  countries  like  Hong  Kong and
Netherlands  would  prefer  most to issue  debt  in  Thailand  and  reduce  corporate
tax  payments  to the  Thai  government.  The  company  may then  remit  income  in
the  form  of interest  from  Thailand  that  would  only  be subject  to the  Thai
withholding  tax  rate,  generally  lower  than  the  Thai  company  tax  rate. As a
result,  a  multinational  company  from  an exemption  country  would  tend  to remit
earnings  in the  form  of deductible  payments,  rather  than  dividend  income.
Such  is the  case  of Hong  Kong  as shown  in  Table  7  whereby  almost  90%  of
income  repatriated  from  Thailand  is in  the  form  of tax-deductible  interest  or
fee  payments.
Deferral  Taxation. The  countries  that  use  deferral  taxation  are
Taiwan,  United  States,  United  Kingdom,  Japan,  and  Singapore. Compared  to the
exemption  case,  the  costs  of equity  finance  are  generally  higher  (lower)  for
firms  in  excess  (deficient)  tax  credit  position. The  reason  for  this  result
is the  following.  When the  subsidiary  is in  a deficient  tax  credit  position
with respect  to its  dividends,  retaining  dividends  in  Thailand  saves  the
parent  company  from  paying  taxes  to the  home  country  on remitted  dividends.
On the  other  hand,  when  the  subsidiary  is in  an excess  foreign  tax  credit
position,  retained  earnings  used  to finance  investment  reduces  the  value  of
excess  foreign  tax  credits  that  can  be used  to  offset  taxes  on  other  sources
of income.
Similarly,  the  cost  under  deferral  can  be higher  or lower  than  that
under  exemption  depending  on whether  the  subsidiary  is in  an excess  or
deficient  tax  credit  position. When  the  firm  is in  an  excess  foreign  tax
credit  position,  the  cost  of debt  finance  tends  to  be higher  under  deferral
since  interest  deductions  not  only  reduce  taxes  paid  to Thailand,  but reduce
excess  foreign  tax  credits  and  increase  the  amount  of taxes  paid  on remitted- 33 -
Table  7
Remittances  of  Profits.  Dividends.  Interest  and  Other  Fees
from  Thailand  to  Home  Country.  1983-87
Profits  Dividonds  Interest  Fees  Total
United  States  1873.7  5374.0  5850.3  2360.4  15458.4
(Z  of  Total)  (12.1)  (34.8)  (37.8)  (15.3)  (100%)
Japan  436.9  1805.0  2144.4  4063.4  8449.7
(Z  of Total)  (5.2)  (21.4)  (25.4)  (48.0)  (100%)
United  Kingdom  562.2  439.2  2995.6  707.7  4704.7
(Z  of  Total)  (11.9)  (9.4)  (63.6)  (15.1)  (1OOZ)
West  Germany  25.6  240.9  904.7  449.6  1620.8
(Z  of Total)  (1.6)  (14.9)  (55.8)  (27.7)  (1002)
Hong  Kong  246.1  1198.1  11077.1  464.8  12986.1
(Z  of Total)  (1.9)  (9.2)  (85.3)  (3.6)  (1002)
France  ..  13.8  190.8  ..  204.6
(2  of Total)  (6.7)  (93.3)  (100%)
Singapore  36.5  155.9  10023.3  ..  10215.7
(Z  of Total)  (0.4)  (1.5  (98.1)  (100Z)
Source: Bank  of Thailand.- 34 -
earnings  received  by the  parent. However,  if  the  firm  is in  a deficient  tax
credit  position,  (i.e.  Japan),  debt  financing  is  less  costly  under  deferral
since  interest  deductions  save  taxes  owing  to  both the  host  country  as  well
as the  home country  to the  extent  that  profits  are  remitted.
With  respect  to "treaty  shopping"  and  deferral  taxation,
multinational  companies  would  still  prefer  using  Hong  Kong,  and to  a lesser
extent,  Switzerland  as sources  of financial  capital. In general,  capital
exporter  countries  using  deferral  taxation  are  less  favorable  locations  for
multinationals.
As for  the  "restructuring"  of finance,  deferral  taxation  generally
increases  the  incentive  for  multinational  subsidiaries  to issue  debt in
Thailand  compared  to  using  equity. Equity  finance  is  less  favorable  since
the  tax  on remitted  earnings  is  negative. When  this  occurs  paying  out
dividends  at the  margin  increases  foreign  tax  credits  and  reduces  taxes  paid
on other  sources  of income  (i.e.  the  multinational  subsidiary  is in  an excess
foreign  tax  credit  position). However,  the  cost  of debt  finance  raised  in
the  home country  remains  the  most  preferable  source  of finance,  given  the
relatively  high  real  rates  of interest  in  Thailand.
Accrual  Taxation. With  accrual  taxation,  the  home country  taxes  both
the  remitted  and  reinvested  profits  of the  multinationals  operating  in
Thailand. Accrual  taxation  applies  to only  branches  of  multinationals  while
deferral  taxation  applies  only  to  subsidiaries.  Thus,  a comparison  of costs
of finance  for  accrual  and  deferral  can  suggest  what incentives  might  exist
to form  branches  rather  than  subsidiaries.
For  most countries,  the  cost  of equity  finance  is  highest  in the
presence  of accrual  taxation  compared  to  either  the  exemption  or deferral
taxation  cases. Compared  to  the  exemption  case,  the  higher  tax  on an  accrual- 35 -
basis  reflects  the  additional  capital  gains  tax  on the  equity  invested  in
branches  (thlis  is  only taxed  by the  home  country). As for  debt  finance
issued  in  Thailand,  the  interest  is  deducted  from  the  home  country  rather
than  Thai company  taxes. This implies  that  the  cost  of debt  finance  issued
in  Thailand  is  generally  lower  for  branches  compared  to the  exemption  case
since  most  capital  exporters  impose  higher  company  tax  rates  than  Thailand.
As regards  "treaty  shopping",  Hong  Kong remains  the  favorite  source
of equity  and  debt  finance,  although  debt  issued  in  Thailand  by  West  German
and  Japanese  branches  is  quite  low  in cost. The  latter  result  reflects  the
high company  tax  rates  in these  countries  at  which  interest  costs  in  Thailand
are  effectively  deductible  from  company  taxes. Thus,  branches  that  are
primarily  debt  financed  would  find  Japan  and  West  Germany  to  be good
locations  for  residence  to  take  advantage  of  high  company  tax  rates  in  those
countries. Note that  the  cost  of issuing  debt  in  Thailand  is  very  high  for
Taiwanese  branches  since  the  Taiwanese  company  tax  rate is  much lower  than
the  Thai tax  rate.
As for "restructuring",  the  taxation  of accrual  income  discourages
the  use of retentions  by  branches  operating  in  Thailand  and  encourages  the
use  of debt  financing  relative  to the  exemption  and  deferral  cases  except  for
Taiwanese  companies  and,  for  the  case  of deferral  only,  U.K. companies. The
latter  can  be explained  by the  substantial  subsidy  afforded  to debt  financing
resulting  from  the  excess  foreign  tax  credit  position  of the  multinational.
(More  debt  finance  reduces  taxes  paid  to the  home  country  on remitted
earnings.)
As to  whether  branches  are  more  preferable  than  subsidiaries,  the
analysis  is less  clear  since  accrual  taxation  lowers  the  cost  of  debt  finance
and increases  the  cost  of equity  finance  for  a  number  of countries. If the
debt/equity  ratio  of the  multinational  firm  operating  in  Thailand  is- 36 -
sufficiently  high,  branch  operations  may  be more  desirable  than  subsidiary
operations.  Thus,  for  tax  reasons  alone,  leveraged  firms  such  as financial
intermediaries  may  prefer  operating  as  a branch  in  Thailand. To better
assess  this  issue,  however,  one  has to  examine  effective  tax  rates  on
capital.
B.  Investment  Decisions
In this  section,  we examine  the  impact  of taxation  on investment  in
long-lived  assets  held  by multinationals  operating  in  Thailand. To assess
the  tax  impact,  we measure  the  user  cost  of capital  and  the  marginal
effective  tax  rate  on  capital  as defined  earlier. The  formulas  used  for  the
estimation  of these  variables  are  derived  in  Annex  I.
An important,  and  difficult,  issue  in  measuring  the  user  cost  of
capital  is the  determination  of financing  costs  faced  by multinational
companies. Since  the  user  cost  of capital  in  part  depends  on the  source  of
finance,  each  taxed  at a  different  rate,  a  model  must  be developed  to show
how  the  real  cost  of finance  is  determined.  Below,  we consider  three  types
of financial  equilibrium:
1.  "Trade-off"  Model. The  cost  of finance  depends  not  only  on taxes
but also  on transaction  costs. Debt is  a favored  source  of finance  from  a
tax  point  of view  since  interest  is  deductible  from  the  company  taxable
income. However,  debt  finance  entails  other  costs,  such  as  higher  bankruptcy
and  agency  costs.  (See  Bartholdy,  Fisher  and  Mintz (1987)  for  a lengthy
description  of these  issues.) In  an international  framework  that  we are
considering,  there  is a choice  between  debt  and  equity  used  by the  subsidiary
as well  as the  parent  company.
In the  "trade-off"  model,  we assume  that  each  source  of finance
entails  its  own  tax  or transaction  costs. The  multinational  chooses  a
financial  policy  that  minimizes  tax  and  transaction  costs,  the  choice  being- 37 -
independent  of the  capital  stock  of the  firm. The cost  of finance  used  by
the  multinational  is  a  weighted  average  of individual  sources  of finance
(equity,  debt  issued  in  Thailand  and  debt issued  in the  home  country). The
weights  used  are  those  observed  for  the  subsidiary  and  the  parent.
2. "Tax  Plannina"  Model.  If there  are  no transaction  costs  involved
in financing,  the  object  of the  multinational  is to  minimize  the  cost  of
finance. With this  model,  the  multinational  uses  the  cheapest  source  of
finance  to acquire  assets,  with financing  raised  either  in  Thailand  or in  the
home country. (We  do not  allow  for  treaty  shopping).  With this  model,  the
firm is  constrained  from  selling  assets  short  so that  arbitrage  is  not
unlimited.
3.  "Peckina  Order"  Model. As suggested  by  Myers (1985),  firms  may
prefer  to finance  investment  with  retentions  first  and  then  use  external
financing  if retentions  are  not  adequate. The "pecking  order"  motive  for
financing  arises  from  models  in  which  external  finance  must  be obtained  from
outside  investors  who  believe  only  poor  quality  firms  are  seeking  funds  from
the  market. The  argument  for  the  use  of the "pecking  order"  model  for
multinational  subsidiaries  is  more difficult  to apply  since  the  parent  has
knowledge  about  the  subsidiary  or  branch. However,  retentions  may still  be
desirable  if they  are  the  cheapest  source  of finance  for  transaction  cost
reasons. In  our  model  below,  retentions  are  assumed  adequate  to finance  the
investment  undertaken  by the  multinational  subsidiary  or  branch.
The above  three  models  for  financial  equilibrium  are  easily  applied
in each  of the  three  tax  regimes. We point  out,  however,  that  "deferral"
taxation  leads  to a "tax  minimizing"  model  without  imposing  constraints  on
short  sales  (unlike  other  potential  models). In  equilibrium,  debt  financing
by the  subsidiary  lowers  taxes  paid  to the  host  country  but increases  taxes
paid to the  home  country  on remitted  dividends  and  other  earnings. Unlike- 38 -
the  estimates  discussed  in  Table  7  above,  we assume  that  the  cost  of finance
on Thai debt is equal to that on equity when evaluating the c.s.t  of capital
for  countries  that  use  deferral  taxation. This also  applies  to the  "trade
off" model calculations.
There  are  two  important  aspects  of financial  policy  that  are ignored
in our  calculations.  First,  we assume  that  companies  operating  in  Thailand
are  domestic-  or foreign-owned  with  marginal  sources  of finance  coming  from
the  primary  owners. Yet,  in  Thailand,  many companies  are  owned  by both  Thai
and  foreign  owners. (This  may  be important  for  foreign  firms  to enjoy
certain  benefits  such  as owning  land  and  bringing  in  expatriates  as
managers.) Since  tax  rates  on the  foreign  parent  company,  particularly  in
the  deferral  and  accrual  taxation  cases,  are  different  than  that  for  domestic
owners,  the  measure  of the  cosL  of finance  would  diff9r  for  the  two  owners.
Second,  our  calculations  are  based  on actual  interest  rates  observed
for  host and  home  country. Financial  arbitrage  across  countries  is  assumed
to  occur  but  not  due  to non-financial  companies  eliminating  interest  rate
differentials  as discussed  in  the  previous  section.
In  Table  8,  we present  user  costs  of capital  estimated  for  companies
operating  in  Thailand. The  user  cost  of capital  is  based  on an exponential
economic  depreciation  rate  of 10%,  averaged  over  machinery  and  building
assets. The  debt-asset  ratio  is  calculated  for  companies  of different
ownership  on the  basis  of financial  statements  as reported  in  Table  5.
(Companies  with  negative  values  of  equity  are  excluded  from  the  sample.) It
is  assumed  that  parent  companies  finance  their  capital  with 30%  debt  in the
home  country. Thus,  we have  not  tried  to  calculate  a country-specific  debt-
asset  ratio  for  each  parent.
The  calculations  presented  in  Table  8  allow  for  variations  in the
user  cost  of capital  depending  on the  determination  of financial  policy  under- 39 -
various  models  and  different  tax  regimes. Our  preferred  calculations  are
those  associated  with  the "trade-off"  model  in  which  a  weighted  average  of
costs  on debt  raised  in  Thailand  and  equity  or  debt  raised  in the  home
country  is taken  as the  firm's  discount  rate.  (In  the  deferral  case,
however,  the  Thai  real  cost  of debt  finance  is assumed  to  be equal  to the
multinational's  weighted  average  cost  of debt  and  equity  finance.) For  the
"tax  planning"  model,  our  calculations  for  the  deferral  case  assume  the  same
value  for  tax  on remitted  earnings  imposed  by the  home  country. In
principle,  the  tax  rate  on remitted  earnings  wouid  be higher  if  the  parent
relied  primarily  on  home  country  debt  rather  than  Thai  debt. With the
"pecking  order"  model,  it is  assumed  that  the  multinational  parent  only  uses
equity  to finance  capital  abroad. Thai  debt  is  used  by the  subsidiary  in  the
case  of  defer.  l taxation  only.  (The  cost  of  Thai  debt  is assumed  to  be
equal  to the  cost  of equity  finance  for  the  parent  so that  it does  not  enter
the  calculations  directly.)  Under  the  "pecking  order"  model,  no home  country
debt is  used in  any  tax  regimes  and  no Thai  debt  finance  is included  except
for  deferral  taxation  which  requires  the  cost  of  Thai debt  and  retentions  to
be equal. Other  data  used to  estimate  the  user  costs  of  capital  is  provided
in  Table  5.
In  Table  9,  we present  marginal  effective  tax  rates  on capital.
These  rates  are  calculated  by measuring  the  difference  between  gross-of-tax
and  net-of-tax  ma-inal rate  of return. The  marginal  rate  of return  on
capital  is  calculated  by taking  the  user  cost  of capital  and  subtracting  off
the  rate  of economic  depreciation.  The  net-of-tax  rate  of return  is  the
marginal  rate  of return  on capital  received  by the  owners. This  would  be the
rate  of return,  adjusted  for  inflation  which,  under  purchasing  power  parity- 40  -
Table  8  User  Coat  of  Capital  for  Forelan  Firms  Investina  In  Thailand  by  Tope  of
OvWerahip  and  Home Countrv  Tax  Retlme  for  Varioua  Financial  Models  - 1989
Trade-off  Model  Tax  Planlina  Peckina-Order
Country  Tax  Regime  SET  Ron-SET  SET  Non-SET  SET  Non-SET
Thailipnd  Exemption  19.7  21.3  17.8  17.7  20.4  23.5
Hong  Kong  Exemption  12.6  13.3  12.3  12.6  12.3  13.7
Taiwan  Exemption  16.8  17.4  15.8  16.8  17.9  18.7
Deferral  16.4  18.1  16.5  17.2  17.6  18.2
Accrual  16.0  17.0  15.3  16.2  16.3  17.3
United  States  Exemption  16.4  17.5  13.6  15.3  16.2  18.5
Deferral  15.3  17.5  14.5  15.2  17.6  18.5
Accrual  15.8  17.4  13.9  15.2  16.7  18.4
United  Kingdom  Exemption  15.8  16.9  13.6  15.4  16.1  18.4
Deferral  15.3  17.5  14.7  15.4  17.2  18.0
Accrual  14.5  15.9  13.0  14.1  15.2  16.6
West Germany  Exemption  21.4  21.5  14.5  15.4  18.9  20.4
Accrual  20.1  20.8  15.8  16.2  22.0  22.8
Japan  Exemption  19.8  20.5  13.0  14.2  15.7  17.7
Deferral  15.0  17.0  13.5  14.2  17.3  18.3
Accrual  16.4  18.1  13.5  14.5  17.7  19.6
Singapore  Exemption  17.1  17.7  14.6  15.4  15.9  16.8
Deferral  15.3  16.2  14.6  15.1  15.9  16.4
Accrual  14.9  15.2  14.0  14.3  15.3  15.6
Netherlands  Exemption  19.8  20.6  16.4  17.3  19.0  20.3
Switzerland  Exemption  17.4  17.8  13.6  14.2  14.4  15.2
France  Exemption  18.4  18.9  15.0  15.9  18.l  19.5
Accrual  18.8  19.3  16.1  16.5  19.9  20.5
lUser  cost of capital ia eetlebted  as:
F'  - (6'er)(1-A)I(1-s)
u  *  Combined  host and  home  country  company  tex rate,  A "  present  value  of capital  cost
allowaaces.
6  - Economic  depreciation  rate,  r  - real  coat  of  finance.- 41 -
leads  to two  different  cases. The  first  is the  case  of net-of  corporate  tax
rates  of return  on assets  differing  across  countries  which  may  arise  from
impediments  to arbitrdge  or taxes  at the  intermediary  or individual  level
that  differ  for  capital  gains  on currency  appreciatien  and  regular  income.
The second  is the  case  of  net-of-tax  real  rates  of return  being  the  same
across  assets  which  would  arise  if there  are  no impediments  to arbitrage  and
there  is  equal  taxation  of income  and  capital  gains  on currency  appreciation
received  by the  lender  to the  firm. The second  set  of calculations  were  made
by assuming  that  all  countries  have inflation  rates  such that  the  real
interest  rate  is equivalent  to  Thailand's  which  is  otherwise  higher  in  most
cases. These  calculations  are  only  done  for  the  trade-off  model.
Based  on the  calculations  presented  in  Tables  8 and  9, the  following
conclusions  are  reached.
1.  Taxation  of Thai  Firms  Relative  to Foreign  Companies.  Based  on
Table  8, domestically-owned  companies  in  Thailand  face  a relatively  high  user
cost  ef capital;  only  those  of French  and  West German  companies  are  higher.
The  user cost  of capital  in  Thailand  reflects  the  high real  interest  rates
faced  by companies  raising  capital  domestically.  The  user  cost  of cap'tal  is
lowest  for  Hong  Kong  companies,  due  mainly  to the  low  cost  of finance  in  Hong
Kong.
Calculations  of effective  tax  rates  (Table  9)  suggest  that  Thai
domestic  firms  tend  to  be taxed  at a lower  rate than  most  foreign  companies
under  both cases  of "equal  real interest  rate"  and "actual  real  interest
rate". The  exception  to this  is  the  case  of West  Germany  (exemption  only),
and  Japan (deferral  with  actual  real  interest  rate.) Hong  Kong's  effective
tax  rates  are  quite  high  primarily  as  a result  of the  low  gross-of-tax  rates
of return  on capital  used in  computing  effective  tax  rates.- 42 -
Table  9  Marginal  Effective  Tax  Rate  for  Foreign  Firms
Investing  in  Thailand  by Ty2e  of Ownership  and
Home-Country Tax Reaime - 1989
(Percentages)
Trade-off  Model
Net  Foreign  Equal  Real  Actual  Real
Tax  Credit  Interest  Rate  Interest  Rate
Country  Position  SET  Non-SET  SET  Non-SET
Thailand  Excess  31.0  40.7  31.0  40.7
Japan  Excess  35.0  41.1  36.0  40.2
Deficient  25.4  46.1  -18.3  15.2
United  States  Excess  42.7  52.1  45.6  54.1
Deficient  46.1  59.7  13.5  38.3
Taiwan  Excess  44.8  49.9  46.2  50.7
Deficient  51.9  60.9  42.9  54.6
United  Kingdom  Excess  45.2  54.3  48.8  57.2
Deficient  52.0  64.2  41.3  58.4
West Germany  Excess  34.8  35.7  34.8  35.7
Deficient  38.8  42.9  26.7  31.6
France  Excess  39.4  43.4  40.1  43.8
Netherlands  Excess  37.9  42.6  38.4  42.8
Singapore  Excess  41.0  46.4  43.8  48.5
Deficient  38.5  46.3  25.1  35.4- 43 -
These  results  assume  accurate  reporting  of income. If  Thai-owned
companies  were to report  low  revenues  or high  costs  to  avoid  company  taxes,
the  uscr  cost  of capital  as  estimated  in  Table  8  would  have  to be adjusted
downward. In fact,  accounting  data  suggest  that  Thai-owned  companies  tend  to
pay  proportionately  less  taxes  than  foreign  companies.  The  user  cost  of
capital  for  Thai  firms  may  therefore  be over-estimated.
2.  ExemRtion  versus  Deferral  Taxation. The  user  cost  of capital  for  a
company  of a specific  country  is often  lower  under  deferral  taxation  than
under  exemption  (Table  8). Much of this  is  due  to the  advantages  afforded  to
foreign-owned  companies  to  finance  investment  in  Thailand  at low  real  rates
of interest  in  their  own  country. Under  the  deferral  case,  the  benefit  of a
lower  cost  of finance  is greater  for  the  multinational  than  under  the
exemption  case  especially  when  a significant  amount  of dividends  are  remitted
to the  parent  which  increases  the  value  of capital  cost  allowance  deductions.
Thus,  much  of the  advantages  for  foreign  companies  is  their  access  to  a lower
cost  of funds  compared  to  Thai  companies.
To gain  a  better  understanding  of the  effect  of  deferral,  we use  the
effective  tax  calculations  in  Table  9.  For  the  "trade-off"  model,  when  real
interest  rates  are  assumed  to  be the  same,  tax  rates  on a deferral  basis  are
generally  higher  than  those  on an exemption  basis. This  would  be expected
since  the  effective  statutory  tax  rate,  which  includes  the  impact  of capital
income  on the  repatriation  tax  rate  imposed  by the  home country,  would  be
higher  than  the  Thai  statutory  tax  rate. Moreover,  the  capital  cost
allowances  are  partly  based  on the  home  country  tax  writeoffs  for  foreign
investments  of  multinationals.  In general,  home  countries  tend  to  provide
less  liberal  writeoffs  so that  capital  cost  allowances  are  less  valuable  on a
present  value  basis  to the  extent  that  dividends  are  remitted.- 44 -
These  results  differ  to some  degree  when  actual  real  interest  rates
are  used.  In the  case  of  Japan,  Singapore  and  the  United  States,  deferral
effective  tax  rates  are  now lower  than  those  in the  exemption  case.  The
reason  is that  these  countries  have  higher  inflation  rates  and lower  real
interest  rates  than  Thailand. Thus,  the  cost  of finance  in  the  home  country
is lower. This  makes  capital  cost  allowances  more  valuable  since  the
discount  rate for  computing  the  present  value  of capital  cost  allowance
writeoff  is lower. In addition,  the  tax  subsidy  associated  with debt  finance
raised  in the  home  country  is  more  valuable  to  the  parent  especially  if
inflation  rates  are  high  relative  to the  nominal  interest  rate  in the  home
country. Both  of these  factors  are  particularly  important  for  Japanese
companies  that  face  low  real  interest  rates  and  tend  to  be more  highly
levered.
3.  Accrual  Taxation. For  each  country  we find  that  the  effective
tax  rate  for  the  accrual  case (under  the  "trade-off"  model)  is  higher  than
the  exemption  case  when real  interest  rates  are  the  same.  The  accrual
effective  tax  rate  is  higher  than  the  deferral  effective  tax  rate  (when  real
interest  rates  are the  same)  generally,  except  Taiwan,  the  United  Kingdom,
and Singapore. When  real  interest  rates  differ,  the  accrual  taxation  leads
to lower  effective  tax  rates  on capital  for  Japanese  firms  as well,
reflecting  the  tax  subsidy  on debt  that  favors  Japanese  companies  when they
remit  income  to Japan.
The  above  is  a surprising  and  unconventional  result. The  relatively
low  cost  of capital  in the  accrual  case  can  arise  for  two  reasons. First,
under  accrual  taxation,  the  effective  statutory  tax  rates  applied  to interest
and  depreciation  deductions  for  tax  purposes  are  based  on the  home  country
rather  than  Thai  company  tax  rates. When the  rate  of company  tax  is  higher- 45 -
in the  homs country,  these  tax  deductions  are  more  valuable. Second,  capital
cost allowances  given  by the  home  country  for  multinational  foreign
investments  are  sometimes  higher  than  that  provided  by the  host  country  (i.e:
the  United  Kingdom). As a result,  the  effective  tax  rate  may  be lower  under
accrual  taxation  compared  to the  other  tax  regimes.
4.  Financial  Models. In general,  the  "tax  planning"  model  yields
the  lowest  user  costs  of capital  but  not the  lowest  effective  tax  rates. The
reasons  are  the  differences  in  the  rates  of return  implied  by different
models. As discussed  in the  previous  section,  the  least  cost  source  of
finance  is  debt  issued  at  home.  This  is due  in  part  to  higher  statutory  tax
rates  and  lower  real  interest  rates  in  home  countries  compared  to Thailand.
With  the "tax  planning"  model,  home  country  debt  has the  minimum  cost,  and,
surprisingly,  higlher  effective  tax  rates.
5.  SET  versus  Non-SET  Comoanies. Companies  that  are  listed  on the
Stock  Exchange  of Thailand  (SET)  are  taxed  at a lower  rate. Withholding
taxes  imposed  by Thailand  on dividends  and  capital  gains  are  also  lower  for
these  companies. It is  not  obvious,  however,  that  a lower  statutory  tax  rate
leads  to a lower  user cost  of capital. As is  well  known,  if  tax  depreciation
and  interest  writeoffs  are  generous  enough,  a lower  statutory  tax  rate  may
penalize  rather  than  subsidize  investment.  In an international  context,
there  is another  dimension. A lower  statutory  tax  rate  may reduce  tax
payments  in  Thailand,  and if  the  firm  is in  a  deficient  foreign  tax  credit
position,  may increase  tax  payments  to  home countries  using  deferral
taxation. Except  for  the  cases  of  Japan  and  United  States,  home-country
taxes  on remitted  dividends  cf SET  companies  are  negative  so a lower
statutory  company  or  withholding  tax  rate  imposed  by Thailand  does  not
necessarily  benefit  the  foreign  company. However,  the  calculations  do
suggest  that  effective  tax  rates  are  lower  for  SET  firms  in  general.- 46 -
IV.  POLICY  OPTIONS  FROM  THE  PERSPECTIVE  OF THAILAND
In the  previous  section,  we found  that  effective  tax  rates  on foreign
capital  vary  considerably  by country  of ownership  and  type  of tax  regime.
Using  this  analysis,  we now  address  policy  issues  related  to the  taxation  of
foreign  capital  from  the  perspective  of the  capital  importing  country. We
first  review  the  objectives  of company  tax  policies,  the  constraints
surrounding  policy  measures  and  then  consider  some  applications  to the  case
of Thailand. In an international  context,  the  determination  of company  tax
policy  is  quite  difficult  given  the  complexities  of tax  systems  and  the
strategic  behavior  of the  parties  concerned.
A.  Economic  Obiectives  of Tax  Policy
To discuss  policy  options,  it is  useful  to review  the  objectives
that  countries  might  pursue  in  taxing  capital  at the  company  level. These
objectives  are the  following:
1.  Raising  Revenue. The  main rationale  for  taxation  is  to raise
revenue. Two types  of taxes  can  be distinguished  with  respect  to this
role. One type  of tax  is  the  "user  charge"  which  is  a payment  made  by
either  individuals  or companies  for  the  benefit  they  receive  from  the
public  sector. User  charges  on companies,  such  as property  taxes,  are
assessed  as  payments  for  public  expenditures  on infrastructure.  They can
also  include  taxes  on economic  rents  earned  by natural  resource  companies
that  exploit  government-owned  property.
Most tax  revenue  raised  by governments  is  a "general  levy"  assessed
on income,  including  personal  and  company  income,  payroll  and  withholding
taxes,  or consumption,  as  with the  VAT and  excise  taxes. Although
governments  tend  to rely  on  all  of these  taxes,  it is  conceivable  that  they
could  rely  on taxes  imposed  on individuals,  such  as  personal  income  and- 47 -
withholding  taxes,  without  relying  on taxes  imposed  on firms  such  as the
company  income  tax.  So  what is  the  role  of the  company  income  tax?
As discussed  by Mintz  and  Seade  (1989),  a company  income  tax  serves
two  roles. The first  role is  to "withhold"  taxes  on income,  primarily
retentions  or accrued  capital  gains,  which  is difficult  to tax  at the
individual  level. The company  tax  ensures  that  individuals  cannot  avoid
the  individual  income  tax  by reinvesting  income  rather  than  withdrawing  it
as dividends  or other  forms  of income  that  are  fully  taxed.
The second  role  of company  income  tax  is important  in the
international  context. If a country  imports  capital,  especially  foreign-
controlled  capital  (direct  investment),  the  company  tax  acts  as a
withholding  tax  on the  income  accruing  to foreigners.  From  the  perspective
of a capital  importer  like  Thailand,  taxation  of income  accruing  to
foreigners  distorts  little  foreign  investment  if the  tax  falls  on rents
accruing  to foreigners  or,  under  foreign  tax  crediting  arrangements,  on
foreign  governments. This  makes  the  company  income  tax,  as  well  as non-
resident  withholding  taxes,  an  efficient  source  of revenue  as economic
costs  for  the  capital  importing  country  are  low.
As shown  in Section  III,  the  latter  role  of company  income  taxes
and  withholding  taxes  on  non-resident  depends  critically  on the  tax  regime
of the  home  country. If the  exemption  tax  system  is  used,  the  company
income  tax  falls  on investors,  not  on governments.  The  company  tax  lowers
the  return  on capital  so that  foreign  capital  flows  are  distorted,  except
when foreign  investors  earn "rents"  (i.e.  the  difference  between  revenues
and economic  costs  of using  capital  and labor).
Under  the  accrual  tax  system,  which  primarily  applies  to  branches
of foreign  companies,  another  result  is  obtained. Since  the  host country's
company  and  withholding  taxes  are  fully  credited  against  foreign  taxes,  the- 48 -
host country's  company  tax  has  no distortionary  effect  on investment.  The
tax  serves  as a revenue-sharing  device  in  the  sense  that  each  unit  of
company  tax  raised  in the  host  country  reduces  a corresponding  amount  of
revenue  accruing  to the  home  country.
Under  the  'deferral"  tax  system,  the  host country's  company  income
tax  withholds  the  subsidiary's  income  accruing  to  both investors  and
governments.  To the  extent  that  the  underlying  company  tax  is  associated
with remitted  dividends  and  credited  against  foreign  taxes  under  the
deferral  system,  the  home  country  loses  revenue  in  favor  of the  host
government.  On the  other  hand,  the  host's  company  tax  also  falls  on
foreign  investors  and  may  discourage  capital  inflows. In  part this  depends
on the  degree  to  which  investments  are  financed  by the  retentions  of the
subsidiary. It  also  depends  on  how the  host  country  taxes  affect  home
country  taxes  on remitted  income.
As the  analysis  of the  previous  section  and  Annex  I suggests,  the
company  tax  can  also  encourage  foreign  capital  investment  under  the
deferral  regime. If a subsidiary  is in  an excess  foreign  tax  credit
position  on dividends,  the  credits  can  be used to reduce  home country  taxes
imposed  on other  forms  of incomes. In  this  case,  deferral  taxation  results
in the  home  country  tax  subsidizing  investments  by subsidiaries  in  the  host
country.
2.  Allocative  Efficiency.  There  are  two  efficiency  issues  relevant  to
the  taxation  of foreign  capital:
First,  company  taxes  affect  the  allocation  of capital  by taxing
assets  unevenly. (We  will  refer  to this  as static  inefficiency.)  In the
international  context,  taxes  oni  assets  vary  across  firms  according  to the
country  of ownership. Also,  taxes  on capital  may  vary  depending  on the
relationship  between  economic  depreciation  and  capital  cost  allowances  of- 49 -
host  and  home countries. Since  neither  Thai  nor  home country  taxes  are
indexed  for  inflation,  effective  tax  rates  vary  across  assets  depending  on
their  useful  life.
Second,  capital  income  taxes  distort  the  allocation  of resources
over  time (dynamic  inefficiency).  In the  presence  of company  taxation,
firms  are  deterred  from  investing  in  capital,  causing  the  economy  to shift
resources  from  future  to current  production.
In a closed  economy,  it  is  often  argued  that  withdrawing  company
income  tax  reduces  static  and  dynamic  inefficiency  associated  with the
taxation  of capital  income. In an open  economy,  however,  one  country's
effort  to  withdraw  the  company  income  tax  may  fall  to improve  allocative
efficiency  and,  moreover,  may lead  to a loss  in  national  income  from  the
perspective  of the  capital  importer. This situation  arises  when  capital
exporting  countries  tax  multinational  investment  under  the  accrual  or
deferral  tax  svstem. If the  accrual  system  is  used,  reducing  the  company
income  tax  in the  host  country  does  not  undo the  company  tax  imposed  by the
capital  exporter. Moreover,  it leads  to a transfer  of revenue  from  the
host to  home  country  public  treasury. For  the  deferral  tax  system,  the
company  tax  levied  by the  host  country  does  affect  investment,  but
eliminating  it  would  not  undo the  impact  of home  country  taxes  on the
multinational's  capital  decisions.  As discussed  above,  it is  also  possible
that  the  elimination  of the  host  country  tax  might  deter  investment,
especially  if  the  host tax  rate  is  more than  the  home  company  tax  rate.
The  above  suggests  that  the  capital  importer's  company  tax  should
be high on foreign  capital  subject  to  accrual  taxation  and  low  on capital
under  exemption  taxation,  with the  deferral  system  generally  lying
somewhere  between  thiese  two  cases. Such  a structure  of company  taxation  is- 50 -
not  feasible  in  practice,  however. Bilateral  tax  treaties  normally  contain
a provision  disallowing  discrimination  on the  basis  of country  of
residence. A limited  extent  of  discrimination  may  nonetheless  be feasible
through  differentiated  non-resident  withholding  taxes,  with relatively  low
rates  applied  to exemption  countries.
3.  Promotion  of Investment.  Company  taxes  are  often  used to  support
other  objectives  besides  revenue-raising  and  allocative  efficiency. Tax
incentives  are  often  used  to  encourage  selected  investment  activities. For
example,  tax  holidays  in  Thailand  have  been  used to  promote  local
participation  and  to  enhance  growth  thrcugh  import-substitution  or export
promotion. They  have  also  been  used  to encourage  the  relocation  of
industries  in less  congested  regions.
The  use  of company  tax  incentives  for  investment  purposes  may  not
be successful  if foreign  capital  is involved. As discussed  above,  under
accrual  taxation,  the  elimination  of a host  country  tax  may  simply  lead  to
a transfer  of revenue  from  the  host to  the  home  country  without  affecting
investment.  Thus,  lower  company  taxes  on  branch  income  or 'Lower
withholding  taxes  on remitted  income  from  the  host  country  may  be
ineffective  if these  taxes  are  credited  abroad. Under  the  exemption
system,  tax  incentives  can  be more  effective  since  host-country  taxes  are
not  credited  abroad.
Under  deferral  taxation,  the  impact  of tax  incentives  is less
clear. A lower  tax  in the  host  country  will  not  always  encourage  company
investment  if  the  multinational  is remitting  dividends  since  the  tax
incentive  will  be partly  undone  by higher  taxes  paid to  the  home country  on
remitted  dividends. This  suggests  that,  under  the  deferral  tax  system,  tax
incentives,  such  as tax  holidays,  should  be restricted  to foreign  capital- 51 -
that  is imported  from  capital  exporters  using  the  exemption  system  rather
than  the  accrual  or deferral  tax  regimes.
The above  discussions  would  have  to  be modified  in the  presence  of
a tax  sparing  provision,  which  is  sometimes  granted  by capital  exporting
countries  to  a less  developed  host  country. This  provision  enables  the
multinational  to  receive  a foreign  tax  credit  at  home for  the  taxes
exempted  in the  host  country. Under  tax  sparing,  host  country's  incentives
remain  effective  and  may  be more attractive  than  under  the  exemption
system.
4.  Distributive  Issues. If  a capital  importing  country  is  not
concerned  with  the  welfare  of foreigners,  distributive  implications  of
company  taxes  on the  income  of foreigners  are  immaterial.  However,  company
taxes  in an open  economy  can  affect  the  wages  paid to  nationals  working  for
foreign  companies. In  particular,  for  a small  open  economy  like  Thailand,
the  effect  of a capital  income  tax  may  be to lower  income  paid  to labor.
Since  the  net-of-company-tax  rate  of return  paid  to shareholders  is
determined  by international  markets  and  unaffected  by the  small  open
economy's  tax  policy,  the  burden  of company  taxation  may  be shifted  to
labor. Thus,  tax  relief  for  foreign  companies  may  be appropriate  if  the
impact  of  wages  is  considered  desirable.
Again,  these  issues  depend  on the  tax  regimes  implemented  in the
home  countries. As discussed  above,  the  most important  distributive
impacts  of  host country  company  taxes  arise  in the  exemption  case  since  the
host country  tax  is  not  credited  abroad. In other  cases,  tax  incentives
adopted  for  distribute  reasons  are  partly  undone  by increases  in taxes  paid
to  home countries.- 52 -
B.  Tax Planning  and  Tax  Competition
Prior  to examining  Thai  tax  policy  in  light  of the  objectives
above,  we consider  tax  planning  (or  tax  arbitrage)  and  tax  competition,
which  affect  some  of the  conclusions  reached  in  the  previous  section.
1.  Tax Planning. Tax  planning  refers  to the  multinational's  effort  to
minimize  taxes,  including  the  shifting  of the  tax  base from  high to low  tax
jurisdictions.  Some  of the  strategies  include  transfer  pricing,  debt
restructuring  and the  allocation  of  overhead  costs  so that  expenses  are
deducted  in  high-tax  jurisdictions  and income  is reported  in low-  tax
jurisdictions.  Tax  planning  therefore  reduces  tax  revenue  accruing  to the
high-tax  country. As a result,  countries  use othex  taxes,  such  as
withholding  taxes  on individuals  and  companies,  to  protect  revenue.
What is less  well  known  is that  tax  planning  can  make  a company  tax
in  a  high-tax  country  quite  generous  to  multinational  investment.  With  tax
planning,  a  multinational  deducts  expenses  at a  higher  statutory  tax  rate
in  one  jurisdiction  and  reports  income  in  a low-tax  jurisdiction.  In
effect,  capital  can  be subsidized  once  tax  planning  is  taken  into  account.
The  effects  of tax  planning  on government  revenue  and  multinational
investment  in the  host  country  is  ameliorated  by the  deferral  and  accrual
taxation  adopted  by some  capital  exporters.  With  accrual  taxation,  and  to
a lesser  extent,  deferral  taxation,  it is  more  difficult  to  shift  income
from  high-tax  to low-tax  countries  since  the  transaction  triggers  more
taxes  paid to the  home country. The  gains  from  tax  planning  therefore  vary
across  multinational  companies  depending  on their  residence.
2. Tax  Competition.  The  second  issue  Ls  "tax  competition"  which
refers  to tax  policies  chosen  by different  countries  in  competition  with
each  other  to attract  foreign  capital. 13 There  are  two  important  aspects
j_/ Much  of this  discussion  is  borrowed  from  Mintz  and  Tulkens  (1989).- 53 -
of tax  competition  that  affect  a capital  importer's  tax  policy:  "tax
exportation"  and  "market  power".
a.  Motivations  for  Taxes  on Foreign  Capital: We first  discuss
"tax  exportation"  assuming  that  the  host  country  is "small"  in  both cap.tal
and  product  markets. In this  setting,  company  taxes  levied  on foreign
capital  have  no impact  on  world  prices  of traded  goods  and  services.
Market  power  of the  host  country  is  discussed  afterwards.
As mentioned  in the  previous  section,  it  may  be in  the  interest  of
a  host country  to "export  taxes"  by taxing  the  income  accruing  to foreign
investors,  or  with tax  crediting,  foreign  governments.  Witn respect  to
foreign  investors,  it is important  to  distinguish  between  industries  that
earn  rents  generated  in the  host country  and industries  that  do  not earn
rents  at all. Rents  are  defined  here as  revenues  net  of the  opportunity
costs  of using  labor  and  capital  or revenues  net  of  wages,  economic
depreciation,  interest  on  borrowed  money  and  the  imputed  cost  of equity
finance. If foreign  investors  do not  earn  rents  in  the  host  country,  a
company  tax  on foreign  capital  may  do more  harm than  good.  The  reason  is
that  the  tax  on capital  lowers  income  earned  by domestic  factors  of
production  by more than  the  domestic  resource  costs  of importing  capital.
Thus,  for  a small  open  economy,  taxing  foreign  investors  who  earn  no rents
may  not  be in the  best interest  of the  host country.
On the  other  hand,  foreign  investors  often  do earn  rents  generated
in  a  host  country. In this  case,  a rent  tax  would  be appropriate.  One
type  of tax,  often  discussed  in  the  literature,  is  a cash-flow  tax  which
allows  capital  to  be expensed  rather  than  allowing  economic  depreciation
and  financing  costs  to  be deducted  from  the  tax  base.  (This  type  of tax
base is  implicitly  used in  many  value-added  tax  systems.) A cash-flow  tax
is  equivalent  to  a rent tax  since  expensing  of  capital  is  equal  to the- 54 -
present  value  of depreciation  and  financing  deductions.  However,  because
no capital  exporting  countries  use  cash-flow  taxes,  a capital  importer  may
find  that  it  must  rely  on company  income  taxes,  rather  than  rent  tax,  to
acquire  rents. The  company  income  tax  is  an imperfect  mechanism  for  this
purpose  since,  unlike  the  cash-flow  tax,  it  falls  on both  rents  and  the
return  to capital,  thereby  distorting  investment  decisions.
Much  of the  above  discussion  applies  to  the  tax  treatment  of
foreign  investment  income  under  the  exemption  system. If  home  governments
use  the  deferral  or accrual  tax  regime,  an important  motivation  for  company
income  tax  by a  host country  is  to take  advantage  of the  crediting  system.
The leading  question  becomes: What instruments  to  use?  Clearly,
withholding  taxes  on remitted  income,  wh  are  fully  credited  against
foreign  taxes  under  the  deferral  or accrual  systems,  ensure  that  the  host
country  acquires  tax  revenue  without  deterring  investment.  A company  tax
on rents,  if fully  credited,  could  also  serve  as a useful  tax  to  withhold
income  accruing  to foreign  governments.  However,  the  host  government  may
fail  to collect  sufficient  revenue  since  the  tax  base,  which  allows  the
imputed  cost  of equity  to  be deducted,  is  smaller  than  the  foreign
government  income  tax  bases  which  only  allow  the  cost  of debt  to  be
deducted. Moreover,  as  discussed  in Section  III  above,  a rent  tax  imposed
by the  host  country  is  not  neutral  in  an international  context.
A host  country  can  maximize  the  value  of foreign  tax  credit  by
adopting  a company  income  tax  similar  to that  used in the  home country.
However,  under  the  deferral  tax  regime,  the  company  income  tax  is exported
(to  foreiOn  governments)  only  when  profits  are  repatriated  and  not
retained. As a result,  to  the  extent  that  investment  is  financed  by the
subsidiary's  retentions,  the  company  tax  will deter  investment.- 55 -
On remitted  income,  however,  it ia  possible  under  the  deferral  tax
for  a  host  country  to  maximize  the  amount  of company  taxes  credited  against
foreign  taxes,  and  at same  time  eliminate  the  impact  on investment  to the
extent  that  the  investment  is  financed  by debt  held  by the  subsidiary.  As
shown  in the  Annex  I,  equivalent  capital  cost  allowances  used  by host  and
haome  countries  would  ensure  that  the  home country  tax  on remitte'd  dividends
would  not affect  multinational  investment  financed  by retentions. In  an
international  context,  this  would  require  host  country  taxes  to  vary  by
country  so that  tax  bases  can  be matched. This  is impossible  since  the
company  income  tax  withholds  income  without  reference  to the  identity  of
the  taxpayer. As a result,  under  the  deferral  tax,  the  company  tax  will
afi  t investment  even  though  the  company  may  be remitting  a large  portion
of its  investment  income  abroad. There  is thus  a trade-off  faced  by the
host count,-y:  reducing  company  taxes  may  encourage  foreign  capi_al  but,  at
the  same  time,  lower  revenue  being  credited  against  foreign  taxes.
Another  reason  for  a capital  importing  country  to use  company
income  taxation  is to take  advantage  of its  power  over  world  prices. As
discussed  above,  a small  capital  importer  incapable  of influencing  world
prices  would  not  want to  use  company  taxes,  except  for  its  role  as  a
"withholding"  tax  on  personal  income. If,  however,  the  country  can
influence  prices  of traded  goods  and  services,  it  may  wish to  use  tax
policy  to  change  prices  in  its  favor. With respect  to company  tax  policy,
a capital  importer  would  impose  a tax  on imported  capital  services  used
domestically  to lower  borrowing  costs  and  a capital  exporter  would
subsidize  its  domestic  capital  to increase  world  interest  rates  that  favor
its  residents. A nmall  country  like  Thailand  would  not  be able  to
influence  interrit.. '.  prices  of  capital  imports. "Market  power'
considerations  are  generally  not  expected  to  be important  in this  context.- 56 -
b.  Nature  of  Tax  Competition.  As defined  above,  tax  competition
results  in  countries,  pursuing  their  self-interest,  choosing  tax  policies
that  affect  the  decisions  of other  countries. In  an international  context,
each  country  worries  about  closely-related  jurisdictions  which  are  either
capital  exporters  or are  adjacent  capital  importers  that  compete  for
foreign  capital  and  managerial  reso:,urces.  An important  question  is  whether
countries  must  offer  a company  tax  similar  to  other  jurisdictions.  We
examine  this  for  two  cases: capital  exporter  and  competing  capital
importers.
Catnital  Exporters  and  Tax  Comnetidion.  As discussed  above,  a
company  tax  imposed  by a  capital  importer  may  be used  to take  advantage  of
tax  crediting  arrangements.  For  this  reason,  a capital  importer  may  wish
to  use  withholding  taxes  or  a similar  company  tax  to  maximize  tax  revenues
credited  against  foreign  taxes. If capital  exporters,  using  the  accrual  or
deferral  tax  systems,  lower  company  taxes  on multinational  foreign-source
income,  a capital  importer  may  be forced  co  reduce  its  own  tax  since  less
tax  revenue  may  be credited  abroad,  thereby  affecting  investment.
Moreover,  under  deferral  it  may  also  be important  to lower  tax  rates  if the
country  wishes  to protect  its  revenue  base.  As illustrated  by  world-wide
company  tax  reform  in  the  1980s,  lower  statutory  tax  rates  in  capital
exporter  countries  caused  many  capital  importers  to reduce  their  statutory
rates;  otherwise,  the  capital  importer  would  find  multinationals  shifting
deductible  expenses  to its  own  jurisdictions  and  reporting  income  abroad.
Also,  under  the  deferral  tax  system,  a  company,  finding  itself  in an  excess
foreign  tax  credit  position  because  of  a lower  tax  rate  imposed  by the  home
country,  would  take  actions,  such  as debt  restructuring  of the  subsidiary,
to  use  up any  excess  foreign  tax  credits.- 57 -
Competing  CaRital  Importing  Countries. When  a capital  importer  is
competing  with  adjacent  countries  for  foreign  capital,  it is often  argued
that  its  company  tax  must  be similar  to that  of its  neighbors. This
argument  is  of limited  validity,  however. Tax competition  among  capital
importers  can  be irrelevant  if  world  prices  of imported  services  are
unaffected  by tax  policies  of small  countries  and if  a crediting  system  is
used  in the  home  country. 14
Tax  competition  becomes  a concern  under  two  conditions. First,  the
host's  concessions  do  not  reduce  foreign  tax  credits  in  the  home  country,
either  because  the  home  country  exempts  foreign  income  or gives  tax
sparing. Second,  the  adjacent  countries  are 'large"  in  relation  to  each
other. Under  these  circumstances,  one  country's  incentives  increase  the
cost  of acquiring  resources  for  another  competing  capital  importer. In
response,  a capital  importer  would  wish to lower  taxes  on foreign  capital
since  its  tax  base is  more  elastic,  making  it  more  difficult  to  withhold
income  accruing  to foreign  investors. Tax  competition  would  cause  adjacent
countries  to reduce  their  reliance  on company  tax  revenues.
C.  Thai ComgaSn-Income and Withholding Taxes
As reviewed  in Section  II,  Thai  company  taxes  on foreign  capital  is
composed  of two  parts:  (i)  withholding  taxes  on remitted  dividends,  branch
profits,  interest  and  fees,  and (ii)  company  income  taxes. Special  tax
concessions  in  the  form  of company  income  and  withholding  tax  holidays  are
given  to attract  foreign  capital  in  competition  with  adjacent  countries,
particularly  Malaysia,  Philippines,  Singapore,  and  Indonesia.
1./  As already  discussed  above,  tax  competition  is  relevant  when  countries
try  to  mairtain  their  tax  revenue  base.- 58 -
In general,  withholding  taxes  in  Thailand  are  lowest  on interest
remitted  to financial  institutions  and  dividends  remitted  to  countries
using  the  exemption  system. The  rates  are  highest  on remitted  income  that
is deductible  for  Thai  company  tax  purposes  (interest  paid  to  non-financial
firms,  rent  and lease  payments,  technical  and  management  fees). In
addition,  foreign  owned  mutual  funds  holding  SET  shares  are  able  to  remit
income  aboard  tax  free.
The structure  of  withholding  taxes  in  Thailand  illustrates  a  number
of issues  raised  above. Withholding  taxes  on income  remitted  to  home
countries  using  the  exemption  tax  system  tend  to  be taxed  a lower  rate  in
recognition  of the  fact  that  the  tax  is  not  creditable.  In some  cases,
however,  tax  relief  from  withholding  levies  is  provided  even  though  the
withholdtng  tax  may  be credited  abroad  and  there  is  no "tax  sparing"  (such
as exemptions  given  on  dividend  withholding  taxes  for  tax  holiday
companies).
As for  the  company  tax,  Thailand  has  an "average"  tax  regime,
except  in those  cases  where  foreign  companies  qualify  for  tax  holidays,  or
understate  profitability  for  tax  purposes. The  Thai  statutory  tax  rate is
not  out  of line  with  major  capital  exporters  except  for  Hong  Kong  which  is
a tax  haven. Thailand  also  provides  tax  deductions  similar  to those  of
exporting  countries,  except  when compared  to  the  United  Kingdom  and
Singapore,  which  grant  relatively  fast  writeoffs  for  multinational  foreign
investments.  This suggests  that  the  Thai  company  tax,  at least  in
principle,  provides  an appropriate  level  of taxation  given  the  tax  regimes
abroad.
A few  features  in the  Thai  company  and  withholding  taxes  are  of
concern,  however. These  issues  illustrate  the  some  of the  points  raised  in
the  earlier  two  sections.- 59 -
1.  Differences  in  withholding  tax  rates  among  countries  with  similar
tax  regimes  increase  tax  planning  opportunities.  For  example,  several
foreign  companies  have their  Thai  subsidiaries  remit  dividends  to
another  subsidiary  in the  Netherlands  rather  than  other  countries  using
the  exemption  system. The reason  for  this  practice  is that  the
applicable  Thai  withholding  tax  rate  on dividends  remitted  to
Netherlands  is only  10%,  much lower  than  the  rates  applied  to other
countries  using  the  exemption  system. It is  desirable  to remove  the
differentials.  Moreover,  some  consideration  could  be given  to raising
the  tax  on interest  accruing  to foreign  financial  institutions  to a
level  similar  to other  remitted  income  that  is  deductible  from  Thai
company  taxes. The  difficulty  with the  latter  is that  a  withholding
tax  higher  than  10%  on interest  paid  to  offshore  financial  institutions
may  not  be creditable.  An alternative  is to  limit  interest  deductions
of a  multinational  subsidiary. (See  the  discussion  in item  4  below.)
2.  Withholding  tax  relief  should  not  be given  for  countries  that  use
the  deferral  or accrual  taxation  with  no "tax  sparing". This
particularly  applies  to  withholding  tax  concessions  given  under  tax
holiday  provisions.  These  concessions  are  unnecessary  since  only  the
foreign  government  gains  from  such  concessions.
3.  The  Thai  definition  of "permanent  establishment"  creates
difficulty  in international  tax  law  since  the  Thai  authorities  often
want  to ensure  that  foreign  activities  that  generate  income  are fully
taxable. Many  companies  raised  concerns  about  the  application  of
Section  76bis  of the  Thai  tax  code  which  allows  the  Thai  authorities  to
tax  foreign  companies  that  may  be only  exporting  goods  to  Thailand,  not
"carrying  on  business  in  Thailand". Much  of the  concern  seemed  to  be
related  to the  lack  of clear  application  of the  law  in  this  area. This- 60 -
issue,  however,  is  confined  to  non-treaty  countries,  including  the
United  States.
4.  Many countries,  such  as Canada  and  recently  the  United  States,
limit  the  amount  of interest  to  be deducted  by multinational
subsidiaries  from  taxes  owing  to the  host  country. In Canada,  a "thin
capitalization"  rule  limits  "non-arm's  length"  interest  deductions  by
foreign  companies  to a certain  percentage  of assets  held  by the
company. New  U.S. rules  limit  interest  deductions  of foreign
multinationals  to a  percentage  of U.S.  taxable  income. Thailand
currently  has  no such  rules,  however. Given  the  low  withholding  taxes
on certain  forms  of remitted  income,  new  rules  that  would  reduce  the
amounts  of interest  deductions  are  desirable.
5.  The  Thai  government  could  consider  a special  tax  or adjustments  in
withholding  taxes  that  would  reduce  the  incentive  for  multinationals  to
use  transfer  pricing. Transfer  pricing  arises  from  understating  or
overstating  commodity  prices  to shift  taxable  income  from  one
jurisdiction  to another. In the  case  of Thailand,  transfer  prices  are
used  to reduce  Thai taxes  when  the  Thai  statutory  tax  rate is  greater
than  the  tax  rate  applied  abroad. A  justification  given  for  using
import  duties  in  Thailand  has  been  to reduce  the  incentive  for
companies  to  overstate  imported  prices.  Import  duties,  however,  are  not
an  appropriate  instrument  for  eliminating  transfer  pricing. Instead,
the  Thai  government  could  impose  special  provisions  to  bring  Thai
company  tax  rates  in line  with  trading  partners.
6.  Data  on accounting  statements  of  Thai  and  foreign  companies
provide  considerable  information  on company  taxes  paid to the  Thai
government.  A striking  feature  is that  a large  number  of companies  do
not  pay  any  company  taxes,  particular  those  companies  not listed  on the- 61 -
Stock  Exchange  of Thailand. In  some  cases,  the  firms  are
extraordinarily  unprofitable  and  in  other  cases  quite  profitable.
Given  that  the  Thai  company  tax  regime  is  not ridden  with  fast
writeoffs  for  capital,  it is  surprising  to find  so  many  companies  not
paying  taxes. A frequent  concern  raised  by many foreign  companies  is
that  their  competitors  are  not  being  taxed  at the  same  level. In  part,
some  companies,  especially  closely-held  ones,  avoid  paying  company
taxes  by not  declaring  income  either  for  book  or tax  purposes,  yet  the
firms  may in fact  be profitable.  Perhaps  there  is  a case  for  a
'minimum  tax"  that  would  be creditable  against  normal  company  taxes
paid  by the  firm.  Such  a minimum  tax  would  add  eomplexity  to the  tax
system  but it could  ensure  that  all  companies  bear  some  tax. The two
minimum  taxes  that  could  work in  Thailand  are  a tax  on distributed
profits  (dividends,  possibly  interest)  or a tax  on the  capital  assets
of the  subsidiary  (such  as the  Canadian  "Large  Corporation  Tax"). The
minimum  tax  on distributed  profits  would  level  the  "playing  field"
across  domestic  and foreign  companies. If structured  correctly,  the
tax  could  be creditable  against  home  country  taxes  on remitted
dividends  from  Thailand.
7.  The company-income  tax  incentives  used  in  Thailand  to attract
foreign  capital  raise  important  issues. The  current  incentive  system
uses a company  and  withholding  tax  holiday,  lasting  from  three  to eight
years. As discussed  by Mintz  (1989),  the  Thai tax  holiday  is  biased
against  long-lived  capital  since  the  assets  are  written  down  during  the
holiday. The remaining  depreciation  allowance  after  the  holiday  may  be
too  low  relative  to true  economic  depreciation,  resulting  higher
effective  tax  rates  than  the  statutory  rates. The  Revenue  department,
however,  does  not review  the  income  statements  of tax  holiday  firms.  It- 62 -
is thus  unclear  to  what extent  depreciation  deductions  are  taken. In
addition,  the  tax  holiday  allows  considerable  abuses  in  that  income
from  related  companies  can  be shifted  into  tax  holidays  companies.
The  tax  holiday  incentive  also  raises  several  policy  issues  in  an
international  context. First,  the  incentive  may  be partly  undone  by taxes
imposed  by capital  exporting  countries  that  use  the  deferral  or accrual  tax
system. This  is  particularly  important  for  United  States,  Taiwanese  and
Japanese  firms 15 to the  extent  that  tax  holiday  profits  are  remitted  abroad
as dividends. Second,  the  argument  given  by the  authorities  for  tax
holidays  is  that  other  adjacent  countries  also  provide  tax  holidays. As a
result  of tax  competition,  these  concerns  can  be exaggerated.  Moreover,  it
is  not  entirely  true  that  a tax  incentive  must  be in the  form  of a tax
holiday. Singapore  attracts  considerable  foreign  capital  without  a tax
holiday;  it  does,  however,  provide  accelerated  depreciation  that  is  biased
in favor  of long-lived  assets.
25/  Under  a  new treaty  between  Thailand  and  Japan  negotiated  in  1989,  a
tax-sparing  provision  is included  so that  the  Thai tax  holidays  do  not
lead  to  more tax  revenue  collected  by the  Japanese  government.  'There
was,  however,  a  petiod  of  more than  ten  years (1977-89)  when the  tax-
sparing  provision  contained  in  an earlier  treaty  was  suspended.- 63 -
V.  INTERNATIONAL  STANDARDS  FOR  TAX  POLICY
In the  previous  sections,  we looked  at  policy  issues  from  the
perspective  of a capital  importing  country  like  Thailand. In this  section,
we take  a  different  point  of  view  and  consider  how tax  systems  can  be
harmonized  internationally.  We have  seen  that  one  of the  major  reasons  for
the  taxation  of foreign  capital  by a  capital  importer  is to "export  taxes"
or to  withhold  the  income  that  would  otherwise  accrue  to foreign  investors
or governments. This  is an  example  of a "beggar  thy  neighbor"  policy  in
which  countries  in  pursuing  their  own  interest  fail  to choose  appropriate
policies  that  would  maximize  world-wide  rather  than  national,  economic
income. 16
A fundamental  policy  question  in an international  context  is
whether  countries,  acting  independently,  levy  too  much or too  little  in
company  taxes  relative  to a  harmonized  tax  system. It is  usually  argued
that  tax  competition  leads  to low  levels  of company  taxation  since  a
national  government  tends  t.o  perceive  its  tax  base  as  being  more  elastic
than  without  competition. Company  taxes,  according  to  this  argument,  tend
to  be set  too  low  in  a competitive  environment:  cooperative  agreements
would  ensure  that  more taxes  are  levied.
To judge  whether  taxes  are  too  high  or too  low in  a  competitive
environment,  we introduce  the  concept  of "fiscal  externalities".  A fiscal
externality  arises  when taxes  imposed  by one  cotntry  either  diminish
L/  Most industrial  countries,  however,  acknowledge  the  need  to  promote
capital  flows  to developing  countries,  possibly  on  humanitarian  rather
than  economic  grounds. The  pervasive  use of tax  sparing  (which
protects  the  benefits  of tax  concessions  granted  by developing
countries)  is  a good  indication.- 64 -
(negative  externality)  or enhance  (positive  externality)  the  welfare  of
another  country. When fiscal  externalities  are  negative,  taxes  chosen  by a
country  in  a competitive  environment  are  too  high since  the  country  ignores
the  economic  costs  imposed  on other  jurisdictions.  Similarly,  where  fiscal
externalities  are  positive,  tax  rates  are  too  low  since  the  country  ignorern
the  benefits  of its  tax  policy  on other  jurisdictions.
With respect  to  company  income  and  withtilding  taxes  imposed  by a
host country  on foreign  capital,  both  types  of fiscal  externalities  can
arise. As emphasized  earlier,  taxes  that  are  "exported"  impose  a  negative
externality  by reducing  the  income  of foreign  investors  or governments;  as
a result,  governments  pursuing  their  own interest  choose  tax  rates  that  are
too  high.  Tax  competition,  which  tends  to  reduce  taxation,  may  be
therefore  viewed  as  beneficial  in terms  of  world-wide  economic  efficiency.
Since  a lower  tax  imposed  by the  capital  exporter  reduces  the  incentive  for
capital  importers  to impose  high company  taxes,  tax  competition  lessens  the
impact  of the  fiscal  externality.
The  other  fiscal  externality  created  by company  taxes  is  of the
positive  type. When  a government  raises  its  tax  on foreign  capital,  the
tax,  if  not fully  credited  abroad,  reduces  the  supply  of capital  and  shifts
the  tax  base  abroad. This  benefits  other  countries  to the  extent  that
there  is  more  capital  available  and  their  tax  base  expands. 17 With  this
fiscal  externality,  uncoordinated  tax  rates  tend  to  be too  low. Moreover,
tax  competition,  which  causes  governments  to choose  lower  tax  rates,
worsens  the  fiscal  externality.
11/ It is  not  always  the  case  that  a  higher  tax  in  one  country  expands  the
tax  base of  another. For  example,  if  capital  flows  into  non-taxed
assets,  other  countries  may  not  benefit  from  increased  tax  revenues.- 65 -
In general,  company  taxes  may  be chosen  too  high  or low  in a
competitive  environment  depending  on  which  effect  dominates. We can  note,
however,  that  when capital  exporters  rely  on deferral  or  accrual  tax
systems,  it is  more  likely  that  company  taxes  are  set  too  high.  With  the
exemption  tax  regime,  it is  ambiguous  as to  whether  company  taxes  are  set
appropriately.
The above  suggest  that  there  are  gains  to  be made  by co-ordinating
tax  policies  across  countries. 18 Current  international  tax  cooperation,
however,  is done  on  a bilateral  rather  than  multilateral  basis. This
contrasts  sharply  with  current  trade  negotiations  (GATT)  and  monetary
policy  cooperation  (G-7)  that  are  done  on a  multilateral  basis. As a
result  of this  bilateral  approach,  governments  have achieved  little  in
limiting  tax  competition,  as illustrated  by the  analysis  of  Thailand
contained  in Sections  III  and  IV  of this  report.
An Assessment  of the  Bilateral  Aprnroach  to Tax  Harmonization
Bilateral  tax  treaties  coordinate  four  major  aspects  of
international  tax  policy  between  negotiating  partners:  (i)  the  definition
of "permanent  establishment",  (ii)  the  rate  of withholding  taxes  on
qualifying  remitted  income,  (iii)  non-discrimination  of tax  policy  between
domestic  and  foreign-controlled  companies  operating  in  a  host country,  and
(iv)  special  provisions  such  as tax  sparing,  the  exemption  of foreign-
source  income  or the  crediting  of  host taxes  against  home country  taxes  on
foreign-source  income.
Tax treaties  do not  cover  all  aspects  of taxation  that  might  affect
international  flows  of income. In  particular,  company  income  tax  rates  and
f/  It is  conceivable  that  international  tax  cooperation  may lead  to
elimination  of tax  concessions  and  eventually  to  higher  company  taxes
levied  by a group  of countries. There  are  important  moderating
influences,  however. First,  home-country  tax  rates  tend  to  set  an
upper  limit  on  host countries'  taxes. Second,  there  remains  tax
competition  from  other  groups  or regions  of potential  hosts.- 66 -
provisions  are  rarely  subject  to treaty  negotiations  even  though  foreign
investors  are  subject  to taxes  imposed  by the  host country. Company  taxes
are  excluded  from  treaty  negotiations  because  they  are  regarded  as domestic
taxes,  unlike  withholding  taxes  on remitted  income. The  non-discrimination
clause,  sometimes  included  in the  treaty,  is  meant  to ensure  that  host
countries  do not  unduly  tax  foreign  capital  or  vary  company-tax  provisions
across  treaty  partners.
Yet, company  taxes  imposed  by  host countries  are  often  used to
withhold  income  from  foreigners.  The  non-discrimination  clause  is intended
to eliminate  the  incentive  to tax  foreign  capital;  nonetheless,  the
incentive  still  remains  as we argued  above  in Section  IV.  In fact,
countries  go to some  length  to  reduce  taxes  levied  on  domestic  capiti
For  example,  Canada  explicitly  provides  a dividend  tax  relief  for  r  -Lt
shareholders  only  and  Thailand  provides  tax  relief  primarily  aim  j.hai-
controlled  firms  that  are  listed  on the  SET.
It is  thus  clear  that  treaties  fail  to fully  coordinate  company  tax
policy;  only  certain  provisions  are  subject  to  coordination.  In  fact,  some
international  tax  provisions  lead  to  tax  policies  that  diminish  rather  than
increase  cooperation.  As stressed  throughout  this  report,  the  foreign-tax-
credit  mechanism  used  by capital  exporters  encourages  capital  importers  to
rely  more on company  income  taxes. Some  capital  exporters  credit  host
country  taxes  paid  by resident  multinationals  operating  in treaty  countries
only. With a treaty  in  place,  capital  importers  are  encouraged  to  raise
company  taxes  since  the  home country  government  bears  some  of the  tax. If
company  taxes  were also  subject  to  negotiation,  capital  importers  would  not
be able  to change  them  unilaterally.
Bilateral  treaties  are intended  to  accomplish  several  important
objectives.  And,  it  would  be useful  to  judge  the  results  of  bilateral
treaty  negotiation  against  these  objectives:- 67 -
(i)  Revenue  Sharing. Tax revenues  are  distributed  between  host  and
home countries  according  to  negotiations.
(ii)  gfficienev.  Tax  harmonization  attempts  to  eliminate  the  impact
of tax  on the  world-wide  allocation  of capital.
(iii) Inter-country  Eauitv.: 19 Taxpayers  of similar  type  bear the
same  level  of taxes  no matter  what  country  they  reside  in.
The  results  of Section  III  suggest  that  the  bilateral  approach
to treaty  negotiation  has  not  eliminated  non-neutralities  associated  with
company  taxes. Effective  tax  rates  vary  considerably  across  firms  and
assets,  depending  on the  ownership  and  type  of tax  reg.me  used  by the
capital  exporter. It is  thus  difficult  to  argue  rhat  treaties  have
successfully  achieved  internation&a  quity  or  world-wide  efficiency.  The
main contributions  of  bilateral  tax  treaties  are  to  limit  the  extent  of
overtaxation,  which  would  occur  if  host-country  taxes  are  not  recognized  in
the  home  country,  or if  deductions  instead  of tax  credits  are  given  at
home.
Treaties  have also  been  unsuccessful  in  revenue-sharing.  The  main
problem  is  that  only  selected  aspects  of international  taxes  are  subject  to
treaty  negotiation,  as  we have  argued  above. Negotiated  withholding  tax
rates  ensure  that  tax  revenues  are  shared  between  countries. However,  the
absence  of negotiation  over  company  income  taxes
means  that  there  is  no explicit  agreement  to share  company  tax  revenues.
A Multilateral  Approach
It is  not surprising  that  bilateral  negotiations  have led  to  a
hodge-podge  of  effective  tax  rates  on  multinational  capital. The
1j/  Musgrave  and  Musgrave  (1982).- 68 -
multilateral  approach  provides  an alternative.  It is commonly  found  in the
context  of federations  where  regional  or  provincial  governments  agree  to
use a common  approach  for  taxing  companies  operating  in  several
jurisdictions.  We consider  two  possible  schemes  under  the  multilateral
approach  to tax  treaties.
The first  scheme  is  currently  used  at the  international  level:
taxing  companies  on the  basis  of separate  accoun  Lng. A company  calculates
its  taxable  income  of a  permanent  establishment  operating  in  a specific
jurisdiction  according  to the  jurisdiction's  tax  law,  or a common  base
agreed  upon  by all  governments.  Usually,  each  government  collects  taxes  by
applying  its  own tax  rate  to the  tax  base.
Two  principles  of taxation  are  used  in this  context. First,  there
is the  "source-based"  tax  in  which  a  jurisdiction  taxes  income  earned
within  its  territory  even  though  some  of the  income  accrues  to foreigners.
With source-based  taxation,  foreign-source  income  earned  by the  resident
multinational  would  be untaxed. As a result,  a country  can  achieve
"capital  import  neutrality"  whereby  companies  in  a  jurisdiction,
regardless  of ownership,  face  the  same  rates  of taxation. However,
"capital  export  neutrality"  is  violated  since  a  multinational  with
residence  in  a source-based  jurisdiction  faces  different  effective  tax
rates  on investments  placed  at  home  and  abroad. Under  this  rule,  capital
export  neutrality  requires  a  common  company  tax  rate  and  common  definition
of taxable  income  across  countries.
Second,  there  is "residence-based"  taxation  in  which  a  jurisdiction
taxes  income  accruing  to residents,  not  to foreigners.  Income  earned  by
foreign-owned  companies  in  such  a  jurisdiction  would  be exempt  from  tax.
Foreign-source  income  earned  by resident  multinationals  would  be fully
taxed. Under  residence-based  taxation,  "capital  export  neutrality"  is
achieved  but  not "capital  Import  neutrality"  sfr.ce  companies  of different- 69 -
ownership  operating  in a  residence-based  jurisdiction  would  face  different
effective  tax  rates. 20 The  residence-based  tax  regime  gives  no incentive
to  export  taxes  since  foreign  capital  is  not  taxed.
In  principle,  the  separate  accounting  approach  should  achieve  a
fair  allocatior.  of capital  across  jurisdictions.  But,  this  is
theoretically  possible  only  if  all  tax  rates  and  provisiors  are the  same
across  countries  to simultaneously  achieve  capitJl-export  and  capital
import  neutrality. But in  practice  thore  are  a number  of  difficulties.
One  problem  is that  overhead  expenditures  are  difficult  to attribute  to a
specific  location. Another  problem  is  that  companies  try  to  allocate
taxable  income  to  low-tax  jurisdictions,  as we discussed  above  in  relation
to transfer  pricing  and  debt  restructuring.
A second  scheme  under  the  multilateral  approach  is  known  as the
"formula  apportionment".  It requires  governments  to  agree  to a commonly
defined  tax  base and  levy  their  own  tax  rate  on income  apportioned  to the
ji.itisdiction.  This  method  is  used  by the  United  States  and  Canada  for  the
payment  of company  taxes  to local  governments.  The tax  base for  a state  or
province  is given  by a share  of  national  taxable  income  earned  by an
establishment;  the  share  is  based  on a  predetermined  combination  of
weights,  such  as the  jurisdictions's  share  of  revenues,  wages  and/or
assets. Sometimes,  as  with  the  case  of Canada,  the  tax  base is largely
determined  by the  central  government.
The  formula  apporticnment  method  leads  to some  behavioral  effects
that  can  be important. As Gordon  and  Wilson  (1985)  point  out,  the  use  of
assets  to apportion  income  encourages  firms  to  report  asset  expenditure  in
low  tax  rate  jurisdictions  to  minimize  taxes. If  sales  revenues  are  used,
2.Q/ Capital  import  neutrality  under  the  residence  rule  requires  a common
company  tax  rate  and  comr^n  definition  of income  across  countries.- 70 -
there  is  an incentive  for  integrated  firms  to  use  transfer  pricing  to shift
revenues  from  high  to low  tax  jurisdictions.  These  problems  are  already
familiar  to the  reader  in  our  discussion  of  earlier  sections  of this
report.
The  multilateral  approach  for  the  conduct  of tax  policy  would  be
more  difficult  in  an international  context  compared  to that  in  a
federation.  There  is no central  government  that  could  use its  economic
policy  to  encourage  cooperative  behavior  among  states. As with
multilateral  trade  negotiations,  it can  be very  difficult  to  achieve
cooperative  behavior  among  a large  number  of countries. Nonetheless,  two
points  can  be made  concerning  the  possibilities  of an agreement.
First,  the  increasing  integration  of capital  markets  across
countries  is forcing  governments  to  reconsider  company  tax  policies  in
light  of capital  mobility. As  we saw in  Section  III  of this  report,  it  is
virtually  impossible  for  an individual  country  to  achieve  tax  neutrality
and  allocative  efficiency  in  an international  framework. If countries  wish
to  remove  distortions  of capital  flows,  multilateral  tax  coordination
becomes  necessary. It is  also  becoming  increasingly  difficult  for
countries  to  maintain  company  tax  revenues. Company  taxes  have  grown
least,  or  declined,  in  many  countries. As capital  markets  become  more
inttgrL  ed,  companies  are  more  able  to take  advantage  of differences  in tax
regimes  across  countries.
Second,  a multilateral  approach  can  be attempted  on a limited
scale. Only  a few  closely-related  countries  are  needed  to  negotiate  a
multilateral  tax  treaty,  using  a common  set  of rules  for  internal  and
external  relations. A limited  approach  may  be necessary  as  a first  step
towards  better  international  coordination  than  has  been  experienced  in the
past  several  decades.APPENDIX
TAXATION  OF  MULTINATIONAL  INVESTMENT:
DERIVATION  OF TECHNICAL  RESULTS
This  Annex  provides  a formal  derivation  of the  cost  of capital  for
multinational  firms. Three  tax  regimes  governing  foreign-source  income  by
the  capital  exporting  (home)  country  are  considered:
(i)  Deferral  in  which  remitted  dividends  and  earnings  to the  parent
are taxed  by the  home country  (retentions  of a subsidiary  operating  in a
foreign  country  is exempt);
(ii)  Exemption  of foreign  source  income  in  which  either  of two  cases
may prevail:  full  exemption  (all  subsidiary  income,  retained  or remitted
ro  the parent is exempt from taxation  by the home country)  and partial
exemption  (interest,  royalty  and  management  fees  received  by the  parent  are
taxed  by the  home  country  while  dividends  and retentions  of the  subsidiary
are  exempt)  and;
(iii)  Full taxation  (or  accrual)  in which  all forms  of remitted  and
anremitted  income  is taxed  by the  home  country  (i.e.  branch  income).
The analysis  begins  with the case of deferral  which is the most
complicated. Normally,  one  would  like to put off the  most difficult  case
to the last. However,  there  are  two reasons  for  presenting  deferral  prior
to the other  cases.  First,  it is easy to derive  the cost of capital  for
the  other  cases  from  the  techniques  used  fcr  deferral. Second,  the  results
arising  from  our  analysis  of  deferral  tax  systems  are  quiite  unconventional,
turning  previous  results  in the  literature  "on  their  head". A few  comments
are appropriate  here, prior to the technical  derivation  of results,  to
emphasize  this  last  point.- 72 -
In an important  contribution  by Hartman  (1985),  it was found  that
subsidiary investments  financed at the margin by retentions are only
influenced  by the  host country's  tax  system  even  though  remitted  dividends
are taxed  by the  home  country. This  result,  similar  to  earlier  ones  on the
capitalization  of dividend  taxes (Auerbach,  1979),  relies  on the notion
that  dividends,  the  difference  between  investment  expenditure  (net  of local
financing) and retentions,  are lump sum income.  When a home country
imposes  a tax on dividends,  the tax is only "lump  sum"  not affecting  the
investment decision of the multinational.  To put it in another  way,
dividend  taxes  are capitalized  in the value of the firm:  when the firm
finances  its investment  by retentions,  the dividend  tax reduces  the net
future  earnings  of the  investment  by the  same  amount  that  the  firm  saves  by
not  paying  out  current  dividends.
The result  of Hartman's  has been very important  in assessing  the
impact of  international taxes on subsidiary investments of foreign
multinationals resident in countries that use  "deferral"  taxes.  As
observed  by Hartman,  most investment  is financed  by retentions  or local
debt.  His theorem,  suggests  that  only  the  host country  company  income  tax
is relevant  to the decisions  of the subsidiary  ,  not that of the home
country.  Recent work  on  transfers of multinational  parents to their
subsidiaries  questions  the  full  applicability  of the  Hartman  result  (Jung,
1987).  Since  subsidiaries mignht  finance invtetmsnt with  transfers  (mnd
simultaneously  receive  dividends  in  return),  then  all  taxes  on divi'dnde  by
the  home country  may  affect  investment  decisions.
In reaction  to the  above,  some  analysts  suggested  that  home  country
taxes  do  not influence  investment  decisions  if there  is  no home tax  payable
on the dividends. In particular,  if a subsidiary  is in an excess  foreign
tax credit  position  (i.e.  the host country  tax on remitted  dividends  is- 73 -
greater  than the  tax owed to the  home country),  the  Hartman  result  can  be
restored  even  if transfers  are  made  by the  parent  to  the  subsidiary.  Hines
and  Hubbard  (1989)  suggest  little  or  no tax  is  paid  on  remitted  earnings  by
U.S.  multinationals  since  the  companies  are  often  in an excess  foreign  tax
credit  position  with respect  to their  subsidiary  dividend  payments  (these
excess  foreign  tax  credits  may  be applied  against  taxes  on  other  income).,
The analysis  below  examines  the  proposition  that  home country  taxes
do influence  investment  decisions  of subsidiaries  using  retentions  and that
the Hartman  result  is incorrect. The reason  for this proposition  arises
from the way in which the home tax on remitted  dividends  is modelled.
Hartman  (and many  others before him) modelled the home tax rate on
dividends  as exogenous,  independent  of any subsidiary  decisions. However,
as pointed  out  by Bruce  (1989),  the  formula  used to  calculate  the  home tax
on dividends  is quite  complicated,  depending  on the  definitions  of taxable
income  by the  host country,  the home country  and the  value of dividends.
If one  models  the  home  country  tax  on remitted  earnings  correctly,  the  home
tax  rate on foreign-source income is not  independent of subsidiary
financing  and investment  decisions  unless  the tax bases  used by the  host
1J'  According to Hines and Hubbard's view, firms in excess  foreign tax
credit  positions  do not pay taxes  on dividends.  Under pre-1988  U.S.
law,  this  view  would  be largely  correct. In fact,  by examining  data  for
1984,  Hines  and  Hubbard  find  that  many  U.S. firms  are  using  the "rhythm
method":  when repatriating  income  to the United  States  the subsidiary
pays a large amount of host country taxes, delaying discretionary
deductions  and investment  tax credits  to later  years  when they  are not
expected  to remit  dividendb. This way  the  firm  would  be  in  an  tnrsn
foreign  tax credit  position,  wipe out any  U.S. taxes  oviin&  in the vear
and  reduce  host  corporate  taxes  in later  years. Recent  U.S. tax  reIfolma
requiring  the foreign  tax credit  to be based on accumulated  earnings
over time reduces  the  value of using  the "rhythm"  method  and increases
the likelihood  of taxes  being  paid on dividends  even though  a firm  may
be in an excess  foreign  tax  credit  position  in a given  year.  Thus,  the
U.S. firm  must  be in  a permanent  excess  credit  position  if it is to  pay
no taxes  to the  U.S.  government  on remitted  earrings.- 74 -
and home countries  are the same.  Thus, even if the subsidiary  finances
its  investment  by retentions  and  local  debt.  the  home country  tax  system  is
still  relevant  to the  cost  of  capital  of the  subsidiary.  This  result  holds
because  the  investment  and  debt  decisions  of the  subsidiary  affect  the  home
country  tax  payable  on dividends. As a consequence,  the  home country  tax
is no longer  lump sum as it influences  both the financing  and investment
decisions  of the  firm.
One might argue, however, that the home country tax system  is
irrelevant  to subsidiary  investment  decisions  if  the  parent  is in  an excess
foreign  tax  credit  position. This argument  is correct  only if the  company
is in an excess  credit  position  on all forms  of foreign-source  income,  not
just  dividend  income. Having  excess  foreign  tax  credits,  however,  is  not  a
tax  minimizing  strategy. 2 A company  would  wish to  apply  excess  foreign  tax
credits  on other qualifying  forms  of foreign  income,  such as royalties,
management  fees  and interest  remitted  from  the  same  country, dividends  and
other  forms  of remitted  income  from  othei  countries  and,  under  the  new  U.S.
rules,  dividends  to be paid in the future.  If the corporate  income  tax
rate is high in the host country, there is an additional  benefit of
restructuring  income  so that  the  company  earns  more domestic  source  income
relative  to foreign  source  income. Thus,  a company  m'v often  choose  to  be
2X1  In the wake of U.S. taA reform, accounting firms in Canada have
developed strategies that allow Canadian subsidiaries of foreign
companies  to use up Canadian  foreign  tax  credits.  One strategy  is to
restrunture  the debt of the subsidiary  so that the  corporate  tax  owing
to Canada,  and the  resulting  excess  foreign  tax  credit,  is reduced. If
the parent also holds the subsidiary  debt, the home country tax on
interest  income  may  be used to soak  up excess  foreign  tax  credits. See
Tax Planning for Canadian Subsidiaries of U.S.  Companies,  Arthur
Andersen  Company,  Toronto,  1989.- 75  -
in a deficient foreign tax credit position.  When this happens, the
subsidiary's  investment  and debt financing  irnfluences  the excess  foreign
tax  credits  that  can  be used  against  home  taxes  on  other  forms  of income.
As we show  below,  the  cost of capital  of the subsidiary  depends  on
the home country tax system  under deferral  even if only retentions  are
solely  used to finance investment. Three factors  are relevant:  (i) the
host country tax system, (ii) the "tax-adjusted"  dividend  payout ratio
(dividends  divided  by post-tax  earnings  of the  subsidiary  as defined  by the
host country's  tax law) and (iii)  differences  between  statutory  tax  rates
in the  host and home countries  as well as the "adjusted"  average  tax rate
relative  to the  home  country's  tax  definition  of subsidiary  profits.
I.  The Basic  Model  for  Deferral  Taxation
We consider  a  model of a  subsidiary  owned entirely  by a  parent
resident  of a foreign  country  that uses the deferral  method.  The model
assumes  that the subsidiary  finances  capital  by retentions  or local  debt.
The multinational  parent  finances  its capital  by raising  debt at home or
using retentions generated  by other operations.  There are no equity
transfers  made  by the  parent  to the  subsidiary. 3
Let nominal  dividends  earned  by the subsidiary  in period  t be Dt
prior to remittance  to the  parent  and  denominated  in local  currency  of the
host  country.  Dividends earned are er-ual  to revenues net of gross
investme.t  expenaditures  financed  by retentions,  borrowed  financing  costs
and corporate  taxes.  The subsidiary's  nominal  revenues  are  efftF[KtJ  where
i/  It  would  not  be difficult  to include  equity  transfers  from  the  parent  to
the subsidiary  for empirical  work.  However,  to emphasize  the points
obtained  by the theoretical  model,  we ignore  such  transfers  to keep  the
model  simple.- 76  -
i is the  local  rate  of inflation  and  F[o] is  a strictly  concave  function
defined  over  the  capital  stock,  Kt.  Nominal  investment  expenditure  is
equal  to efft(kt+6Kt).  The  subsidiary  finances  capital  with  new issues  of
nominal  bonds  equal  to it  and  pays  out interest  on its  stock  of  bonds  equal
to iBt, (i is the nominal interest  rate of local debt).  Letting  Tt
denoting  corporate  taxes  paid  by the  subsidiary,  its  nominal  dividends  are
thus  the  followirg:
Dt  - e  .t[K]  - e  (K  +6K  ) + B  -iB - T  (1) t  t  t  t  t  t
Corporate  taxes  paid to  the  host  country  in  local  currency  is levied  at the
rate u on nominal revenue  net of capital  costs allowances  and-VrAterest
costs:
Tt  - u(e  F[Kt  - aK  t-iBt)  (2)
whereby  a  is the  capital  cost  allowance  rate  on an  exponential  basis  and  Kt
is the undepreciated  capital  cost allowance  base.  This base is that  used
for tax purposes  and is equal to the remaining  amount  of undepreciated
investment expenditures accumulated  since the start-up time r  to the
current  period-
Kt  ft(Ks  +  K)e  e  ()ds  (3)
The above  values  denoted  in local  currency  can be converted  into
the home country's  currency  by using the exchange  rate xt, expresscd  as
units  of home currency  per unit of host currency,  such as U.S. dollar  per
Baht.  We assume  that the exchange  rate in every  period  is determined  by
purchasing  power  parity. Letting  the  initial  value  of the  exchange  rate  be
equal to unity,  xt - ef*t/efit  with x* denoting  the inflation  rate in the
home country. Thus,  if the  anticipated  inflation  rate in the  home  country- 77 -
is higher  than the  local  inflation  rate,  the  local  currency  appreciates  in
value, increasing  the value of dividends  remitted  to the home country.
Multiplying  the  value of dividends  in local  currency  by the  exchange  rate
and substituting  equation  (2)  into (1),  we obtain  the following  expression
for  dividends  denoted  in  the  home  country's  currency:
D* - x Dt - e  F[K ](1-u) -(6K  +K )e t  tt  t  t  t
A  .
+  e  W-)(ucgK  +B  t-iB (I-u))  (4)
The  Determinat  ion  of  Taxes  on Remitted  Income
When  a multinational  remits  dividends,  it  pays  a  withholding  tax  to
the  local  government  equal  to ODt  in local  currency,  or,  in  home country
currency,  OD*. This  withholding  tax,  in the  case  of deferral  taxation,  is
t.
credited  against  the corporate  income  tax levied  on foreign-source  income
by the home country.  Also, corporate  income  taxes  deemed  to be paid on
dividends  in the  host country  are credited  against  home country  corporate
taxes,  if there is sufficient  ownership  by the  parent.  (In  the  U.S. the
level  of ownership  required  for  an indirect  corporate  tax  credit  is  10%  and
in  some  countries  as low  as 5%).
The credit for corporate income taxes under deferral is quite
complicated,  based on the dividend payout ratio of the subsidiary  as
defined  by the  home countrv  tax  authorities. The  exact  calculation  of the
credit  for  daemed  corporate  taxes  is the  following. The  amount  of foreign
corporate income taxes credited  by tne home country is deemed to be  a
proportion  of  local  corporate  taxes  denoted  in  the  home  country's  currency.
The  proportion used is dividends remitted (in home country currency)
divided  by net-of-foreign  tax  earnings  of the  subsidiary  as defined  by the
home country:  taxable  profits  of the subsidiary  less foreign  taxes,  all- 78 -
denoted  in the  home country's  currency. The foreign  tax  credit  given  by a
country using the deferral  method for corporate  income  and withholding
taxes  paid in the  host  country  is  equal  to:
FTCt - (T  xt D*t/(n*-x  tT ))  t  D  5
with  1* denoting  taxable  profits  of the  subsidiary  as  defined  by the  home t
country. (An  expression  for  taxable  profits  is  explicitly  derived  below).
The  amount  of corporate  income  tax  paid to  the  home country  is  also
complicated  since dividends,  gross  of withholding  and corporate  taxes in
the  host country,  are taxable  as foreign-source  income. The taxable  value
of gross  dividends  is  calculated  as the  proportion  of profits  attributed  to
the dividend  payout.  This  proporation  is the  same as that  calculated  for
the  foreign  tax  credit. The  corporate  tax  paid  to the  home  country  is  thus
equal  to the  rate  of tax,  u*,  multiplied  by the  taxable  earnings  attributed
as remitted  to the  parent,  net  of the  foreign  tax  credit: 4
t  uE*H*  D*t/(I*t-xtTt)  FTCt
_.D* [  u nt-Ttxt  ]-OD*  (6) t  *  t
t  tt
E't- Ttxt
The  value  of the  subsidiary's  taxable  income  as defined  by the  home country
is equal  to revenues  net of deprecation  (measured  according  to the  capital
A  Another  way of calculating  the  tax owing to the  home government  is by
measuring  foreign  source  income  of the  parent  as dividends  received
(gross  of  withholding  taxes  paid  to the  host  country)  plus  corporate
taxes  paid  to the  host  country  attributed  to the  dividends. This
implies that Tt - u*[D* + xtTtD*t/(lt-Ttxt)]  - FTC.  Note that we
would  obtain  the  same  expression  for  equation  (7)  using  this
interpretation.- 79  -
cost allowance rate used by  the home country's tax authorities) and
interest  costs  denoted  in the  home  country's  currency: 5
]I-  e  e  F[Kt] - a*K* - iBtxt  (7)
Similar  to equation  (3),  the  value  of the  undepreciated  capital  cost
allowance  base,  K*, is the  sum  of  undepreciated  gross  investment
expenditures  of the  subsidiaries,  denoted  in  the  home  country's  -rency:
A*t  Jtx  e 5 s(K +6K )e  Q*(t  S)ds  - ftef  s(K  +6K  )e 0 a  'ds  (8)
We may note that the terms  in equation  (6)  can  be combined  to obtain  the
following:
ir*t  ~~~~~~~AA
Xt - u*I**  - x Tt- (u*-u)e  F[o] - (u*-u)iB x  - {u*a*K*  - ux K a)  (9) t  tt  t  t  t  t  t
Yt - H* - xtTt - e  tF[o](l.u) - (a*K* - ux aK ) -(l-u)x iB  (10)
t  t  t  ~~~t  t  t  t  t
The  Value  of the  Multinational's  Investment  in the  Host  Country
We  are  now  in  position  to  describe  the  value  of  the
multinational's  investment  in the  host  country,  taking  into  account  both
the  host  and  home  country's  tax  systems. Denoting  Dh as the  net-of-tax
dividend  received  by the  parent  from  the  subsidiary  in  period  t,  it can  be
l_  In this formulation,  it is assumed  that there are no interest  costs
incurred in the home country  that are allocated  to the subsidiary's
taxable  profits  generated  in the  host country. Recent  changes  to U.S.
tax law  requires  that interest  costs  be apportioned  between  subsidiary
and  parent  taxable  income  according  to the  proportion  of assets  held in
each country.  This could be modelled  as well using the techniques
presented  in this  section.- 80 -
shown  to be  equal  to the value  of  remitted  dividends net  of the
"repatriatTon"  tax,  at,  as shown  in  Bruce  (1989):
h Dht  - D*t(1-8)  - T*t- Dt (l-  at)(
u*I*  - xtTt
with the repatriation tax equal at - t  - Xt/Yt,  whereby the
II - xtTt
numerator,  excess  home  country  taxes  on foreign  source  profits,  is  defined  by
equation (9)  and the denominator,  "adjusted  net-of-foreign  tax profits"  is
defined  by equation  (10). The  withholding  tax  imposed  by the  host  country  on
dividend remittances  is eliminated  by the tax credit given  by the home
country. Thus,  the  repatriation  tax  only  depends  on differences  between  host
and  home  country  taxes  on subsidiary  profits.
Income  received  by the  multinational  parent  is  equal  to  net-of-tax
dividends  less  any  accrued  capital  gains  taxes  paid  by the  parent  on equity
holdings  in  the  subsidiary,  cEt. The  effective  accrued  capital  gains  tax
is a fiction  in that,  at most,  a parent  pays  capital  gains  taxes  (usually
to the  home country)  only at the time that assets  are sold in a foreign
country.  For purposes  of the  model,  we include  an "accrual-equivalent"
capital  gains  tax  rate  to complete  the  model.
The  present  value  of the  income  accruing  to the'parent  is equal  to
nominal  flows of income,  discounted  by the nominal  discount  rate of the
parent,  p,  which  is  defined  more  precisely  later:
J  D  -cmd  OD  J  P/(1-C)t E0  0 e  cEt  0dt  - f  e(  PD*  (l-t)/(l-c))  dt  (12)
As shown by Boadway [1988],  the right  hand side of expression  (12) is
obtained by  differentiating  the middle expression  with respect to t,
dividing  the  differential  equaticn  by (1-c)  and  solving  for  the  expression81 -
on the  right  hand side,  using  the  definition  of  Dh.  An important  property t
to  note with  respect  to the  above  expression  is that  the  repatriation  tax  iI
not necessarily independent  of time, depending  on decisions  made by the
subsidiary.
Prior  to solving  the  model,  two  points  are  made  here to delineate  the
above expressions  for taxes  paid on foreign  source income  (equations  (6),
(4), (9),  and (10))  from  earlier  work in the  literature. First,  the  rate  of
corporate taxes levied by the home country on foreign source income  Is
independent  of financing  and investment  decisions  only  under  very restrictive
conditions  as established  by the  following  lemma:
Lemma:  Condition  for the Exogeneity  of the  Home Country's  Tax Rate Under
Deferral  Taxation:
Let the  following  two  conditions  hold:
(a) host and  home  country  tax  depreciation  rates  are  the  same  (a-a*).
(b)  inflation rates are the same (ff*  - i).
Then, at - (u*-u)/(l-u).
A  A
Proof: If  a* - a  and r*=,r,  xtKt  - Kt for  all  t using  equations  (3)  and (8).
From  equations  (9)  and (10)  u*lI*  - xtTt  (u*-u)n*  and  II*  - x  Tt- (l-u)1X*.
t  t  t  tt  t'
This  implies  at  - (u*-u)/(1-u).
The home  country tax, at, is independent of capital stock and
financing  decisions  of the subsidiary  if the tax  bases of the  host and home
countries  are  equivalent. It is clear  this  requires  capital  cost allowances
to be eqiuivalent.  It also requires  inflation  rates to be identical.  The
reason  for  this  latter  result  is  that  the  capital  cost  allowance  base  used  for
tax  purposes  by the  host country  is  based  on investment  expenditures  that  rise
in  nominal  terms  by the  inflation  rate  of the  host  country. However,  the  home- 82 -
country  calculates  the  capital  cost  allowance  base in  a different  way.  First,
it  converts  nominal  investment  expenditures  denominated  in  the  host currency
into  home  currency. Then,  it  adds  up the  undepreciated  amount  of  past
investment  expenditures  to arrive  at the  capital  cost  allowance  base,  K*.
When the repatriation  tax is exogenous, the value of the tax on
dividends  is equal  to the difference  between  host and  home country  statutory
tax rates  on the grossed  up value of dividends.  The withholding  tax rate
disappears  because  it  is fully  credited. This  treatment  of the  tax  on foreign
source  income  is the "textbook"  version  used for descriptive  purposea.  (See
for example,  Brean [1982]  and  Alworth  [1988]). Moreover,  sinee  the tax rate
on each dollar  of dividends  received  is independent  of subsidiary  investment
and financing  decisions,  the  above  conditions  lead  to the  Hartman  result  that
investment decisions,  financed  by retentions,  are indepandent  of the home
country's  tax  system. In general,  however,  this  determination  of the  tax  rate
on foreign  source  income  and  the  impact  on investment  is  too  simplistic.
The second  point is that  we assume  that in every  period  the firm is
able to use its foreign  tax credits  owing on dividend  repatriations. In
particular,  the tax  paid to the  home country  in equation  (6)  may  be positive
(deficient  foreign  tax  credits)  or negative  (excess  foreign  tax  credits). The
latter  case  applies  only  when the  multinational  is  able  to  use  excess
foreign  tax  credits  on dividends  against  taxes  owing  on other  remittances  of
for6ign-source  income. In our  model,  T*  0 implying  that  any  excess  foreign
tax  credits  on dividends  are applied  to taxes  on other  foreign-source  income.
Otherwise,  if the  multinational  is in an excess  foreign  tax credit  position
for  all  forms  of income,  it  pays  no tax  on any income  to the  home country 6
i/  We also  do not try  to  model  the  new  U.S.  rules  applying  to the  calculation
of taxes on foreign source income  based on accumulated  dividends and
profits  over  time  to  define  the  dividend  payout  ratio.- 83 -
implying  that  at  - 0.  (This  case is  des..ribed  below  when  we turn  to the  fall
and  partial  exemption  treatment  of foreign  source  income.)
Solutions  to the  model
The problem  for  the  multinational  is to maximize  the  value  of its
equity  (equation  (12))  subject  to two  constraints  which are the equations
of motion for the evolution  of the undepreciated  capital  cost allowance
used  by the  bost  and  home countries:
Kt  -K  t  + e  (tl Kt }  (13.1)
A  A
Kt  _a*K*t  + e  (Kt+ 6K  t  (13.2)
A  A
The control variables for the multinational are thuls  Kt, Kt, K*t,  and Bt
which  maximize  Eo subject  to the  constraints  (13.1)  and (13.2)  for  each  period
of time.  Denoting the Lagrange  multipliers  for each of these constraints
respectively  as AI(t) and A2(t), the Euler conditions  for the above  problem
yield  the  following:
KR:  (l-at)(Ft(l-u)-6)  + Ale  )  6(1-c)  + A26(1-c)  - D*e  B*t  3at
it
- (p/(l-c)-1*)((lM-t)  -Ale  (1-C)  -A2 (l-C)}  6  (L+(ff-1r*)A  )e  (i-C)
+X2(1-c) + °  (14.1)
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Interpretation  of First  Order  Conaditions
These complicated  optimality  conditions for the investment  and
financing  decisions  of the subsidiary  can be easily  manipulated  to obtain
equilibrium sonditions for  the capital stock and debt policy of the
subsidiary.  The  steady  state  conditions  turn  out  to  be rather  simple. With
capital  stock  constant,  the real value of depreciation  allowances  in home
country currency and the stock of bonds being constant  over time, the- 85 -
"repatriation tax", a, on remitted earnings is constant. 7 Combining
equations  (14.1),  (14.2)  and (14.3)  we obtain  the cost of capital  formula
for  a subsidiary  as follows:
F'  (6+o/(l-c)-x*)  (1-A)
(1-U)
u  - u  + d[u*  u  -a(l-u)]
A  _  uafl-d(l-a))  +  d(u*-a)?a*
P/(l-c)+a-wr*+r  p/(l-c)+G*
and  d  - Dr*/[Yt(l-o)]  (the  "tax  adjusted"  dividend  payout  ratio).
The cost of capital  for the multinational  subsidiary  is scmewhat
different  from  the  usual  formulation  obtained  for  domestic-controlled  firm.
The main differences  lie with the adjustments  made for the impact of
investment  decisions  on the  repatriatioii  tax  faced  by the  parent  on remitted
earrings. With the  holding  of capital,  the  parent  incurs  depreciation  costs
(6) and real financing costs, the opportunity  cost of equity financing
adjusted for  the home country's inflation rate: p/(1-c)-,K*. The net
1/ More formally,  these  steady  state  conditions  are  the  following:
(i)  Kt  0 and  At  - wBt.
(ii)  i1 -(ff-n*)) 1 and  i2  0  °
A  a 
(iii)  Kt  -6Kfe  fe  (  )  - 6K  e(+)  for  r  - -r  and
A  lr*t
K*  6Kte  /(a*  + w*) for  r--.
Using  these  conditions  one  can show  that  0  by substituting  (i)  to
(iii)  into  equations  shown  in  expression  (14.1)  after  obtaining  the
A  A
values  for  Kt and  K*t.- 86 -
revenues  earned  by the subsidiary  (F'  at the  margin)  are taxed  at the  host
country's corporate tax rate (u) plus the additional repatriation  tax
imposed  on net revenues  by the home country  when dividends  are remitted
(this is reflected in the "tax adjusted"  dividend  payout ratio).  This
additional  repatriation  tax results from two sources.  First,  when more
capital  investment  is undertaken  by the subsidiary,  additional  taxes  equal
to the difference  between  home and host country  statutory  tax rates are
levied.  (This is the "taxable  income"  effect  obtained  by differentiating
the  numerator  of the  repatriation  tax,  X, in expression  (9)).  Second,  with
more investment,  the tax base used to calculate  the repatriation  tax is
broadened (Y in equation  (10)).  This "base-broadening"  effect  causes  the
repatriation  tax  to  fall  by a(l-u).
The present  value of depreciation  allowances  also depends on the
repatriation  tax. When  the  subsidiary  claims  capital  cost  allowances  due  to
investment  in the host country  it lowers  both host country  corporate  and
home country  repatriation  taxes  each  year.  With increased  tax  depreciation
allowances  claimed  in the host  country,  the  host  country  tax  and
repatriation  tax (via  the  foreign  tax  credit)  is  affected  (first  term  of the
expression  for  A) as well  as the  home  country  tax  on gross-of-credit  foreign
source  income  (the  second  term  of the  expression  for  A).  Again,  two  impacts
can  be distinguished:  "deduction"  and "base-broadening"  effects. With more
tax depreciation  claimed  for the  host country  tax, foreign  tax credits  are
reduced  when Jncome  is remitted,  thereby  increasing  the repatriation  tax  by
dua. However,  the  tax  depreciation  is  claimed  for  the  host  country  tax,  the
repatriation  tax base is narrowed  reducing  the value of tax depreciation
deduction  by duaoa  A similar  reasoning  applied  -o the second  term for  A.
More investment  leads  to additional  tax  depreciation  claims  valued  by u*a*.
However,  tax depreciation  narrows  the repatriation  tax  base lowering  home
country  tax  depreciation  claims  by ou*a*.- 87 -
In addition, the discounting  of the value of tax depreciation
allowances  differs. Host country  depreciation  allowances  are  discounted  by
the multinational's  home country  nominal  cost of finance,  p/(l-c),  taking
into account the anticipated  devaluation  in the host country currency
relative  to the  home country  currency  (f-fX*).  Home  country  tax  depreciation
is only  discounted  by the  nominal  cost  of funds  expressed  in  home country
terms. The reason  for  the  differences  in discounting  arises  from  the
A  A
coiiputation  of the  capital  cost  allowances  bases,  xtKt  and  K*.  If the  host
country's  currency  is  depreciating,  the  undepreciated  investment
expenditures carried for calculating  host country taxes also decline,
reducing  the  present  value  of tax  depreciation  as reflected  in a  higher  cost
-- f  finance  (p1(l-c)  - ir* +  ir.  On  the  other  hand,  tax  depreciation
allowances  for  home  country  purposes  are  calculated  by converting  investment
expenditures  into  home  country  currency  before  depreciating  the  tax  base.
The  Hartman  result  can  be restored  in  three  ways.  The  most obvious
is the  situation  when the  company  does  not  remit  any  dividends  whatsoever
(d-0). In the  steady  state  (K-0),  this  requires  replacement  investment  to
be more than the net-of-host-country-tax  profitability. The second  case
which  restores  the  Hartman  result  is to introduce  a constraint  that,  if the
multinational  has  excess  foreign  tax  credits  on dividends,  none  or a limited
amount  may be credited  against  other  taxes.  If this  constraint  is  binding
in all periods, the repatriation tax rate is unaffected by marginal
investment  and financing  decisions  of teh  subsidiary.  The  third  case  is  the
most interesting.  If tax bases are equivalent, requiring o-a* and w-mr*,  a
is exogenous.  By substituting  o-(u*-u)/(l-u)  into the cost of capital
expression,  one  may  obtain:
Ft  - (6+p/(l-c)-f*)  ua  (15')
(1-U)  p/(l-c)+a88  -
This is the familiar  cost of capital  expression  which would be obtained
under  the Hartman  result. In this  case,  the  home country's  tax  system  may
affect  the  cost  of capital  only  through  the  discounc  rate  of the  parent. 8
The  foregoing analysis provides three other results that are
contrary  to past literature.  First,  the cost of capital  of the foreign
subsidiary  depends  on the  difference  between  host  and  home country  statutory
tax rates,  not average  tax rates (taxes  divided  by profits)  as sometimes
used in the literature. (See,  for example,  Hartman  (1986)  and  Grubert  and
Mutti's (1989)  recent  study  of foreign  investment). Even  if the  subsidiary
is in an excess  foreign  tax  credit  position,  with respect  to dividends,  the
cost  of capital  will depend  on the  negative  value  of the  repatriation  tax  so
long as tax credits  are used against  taxes  paid on other forms  of income.
When the subsidiary  uses one  more unit of capital  stock,  it increases  the
value  of excess  foreign  tax  credits  and  reduces  the  amount  of tax  owing  on
other  forms  of income. This  can  contribute  to a lower  cost  of capital.
Second, the above analysis also suggests that a cash flow tax
imposed  by the  host country  may not  be neutral  for  multinationals  operating
from countries  using the deferral  system.  This is contrary  to the usual
argument  that a host country's  cash flow  tax  would  be neutral  with respect
to investment,  with the cash flow tax possibly being credited against
foreign taxes on remitted  income.  (See for example,  Boadway,  Bruce and
Mintz [1987]  and Bird and McLure [1990]). If the  host country  imposed  a
cash  flow  tax,  the  cost  of capital  would  be the  following:
g.  This is related  to the treatment  of capital  gains  which  may  be taxed  by
the home country by treaty provision.  Also, if the parent finances
capital  with  debt  raised  in the  home  country,  the  p-i*(1-u*).- 89 -
F'  - (6+p/(l-c)-tr*)[1A  l)
F_  __  _  __  __  _(15")
(1-U)
U  - Ud[u*  -u  -o(l-u)]
A  - u(l-d(1-o))  +  da*(u*-a)/(p/(l-c)+a*)
Even  with  a cash  flow  tax  in  the  host  country,  the  tax  rate,  u, would
influence  the  cost  of capital  through  u1,  a  and  A.  Neutrality  of the  host
country  tax can  be restored,  however,  if there  are  no dividend  repatriations
(d-0) or if the  home  country  also  uses  a cash  flow  tax.
Finally,  the above  analysis  suggests  that  there  may  be a unique  debt
decision  for the subsidiary  whereby  the  net-of-tax  costs  of debt  and equity
finance  are equal to each other.  Using the first  order  condition  for the
local debt decision of the subsidiary (equation (14.4)),  we obtain the
following  equilibrium  decision  for  the  optimal  debt  policy:
p
i(l-u) - _  (16)
The cost of local  debt finance  is the interest  cost  net of host and
home country taxes.  Debt deductions  in the host country  lowers  corporate
taxes paid in the host country by u  and repatriation  taxes on remitted
dividends by d(u*-u-o(l-u)).  In equilibrium, the optimal  debt decision
requires  the equality  of the cost of the multinational's  equity  and debt
finance  although  the intuition  underlying  this is somewhat  complicated  to
explain.  When the subsidiary  incurs  an extra  dollar  of interest  costs,  it
reduces  the  rate  of repatriation  tax,  a, through  the "deduction"  effect  if
u* > u.  However,  interest  deductions  causes  a "base  narrowing"  effect  in the
the repatriation tax rate rises by o(l-u).  If the "deduction"  effect
dominates  the "base  narrowing"  effect  (or  vice  versa),  u*-u-o(l-u)  > 0 (<0).- 90  -
In addition,  bond finance  lowers  the amount  of dividends  repatriated  abroad
in the  steady  state. By issuing  debt,  the  amount  of dividends  remitted
falls,  reducing  the  tax  advantages  of interest  deductions  against  the
repatriation tax  when u*-u-o(l-u) >  0 (implying  ui  >  u).  The second order
condition  for the  debt  decision,  evaluated  at the  steady-sate  conditions,  is
thus  quite  instructive.  Differentiating  (14.4)  with respect  to B,  yields:
2i 2
6 E  -i (1-u) [u* - u -a(l-u)]  (16')
6B2  yr  (1-u)
For  an interior  solution  for  debt  policy,  the  expresson  in (16')  must
be negative  implying  u*-u-o(l-u)  >  0.  If the  home country  tax rate is  more
than the  host country's  (u*  >  u), the repatriation  tax,  a, which  depends  on
tax rates and capital  cost ailowances,  can be negative  or positive  for an
interior  solution. If u* >  u, the repatriation  tax  must  be negative  for  an
interior  solution.  In fact,  at the steady  state,  the impact  of interest
deductions on the repatriation  tax depends on capital cost allowances.
Substituting  equations  (9)  and (10)  into  a  yields  for  u*-u -a(l-u)
A  A  (X*)t
- K  K  - aKe  > 0.
That is,  the  value  of the  capital  cost allowances,  in  home currency,  must  be
greater  under  the  home  country  tax  compared  to  the  home  country  tax. Note if
the tax bases and inflation  rates are the same for host and home country
taxes,  the second  order  condition  will be equal  to zero, implying  that the
firm is indifferent  about  financial  policy. And, if  capital  cost  allowances
are  large  in the  host  country,  the  second  order  condition  will imply  that  the
debt  policy  minimizes  the  value  of the firm.  If we imposed  restrictions  on
debt  (i.e. debt cannot be negative  or debt can be no more than capital
stock),  the  firm  would  either  move to all  debt  or all  equity  finance.- 91
The specification  of the discount  rate of the  multinational  has not
been made clear yet.  Essentially,  the discount  rate, p, depends on the
source  of finance  used  by the  parent. If  equity  is  used,  the  p-p*  whereby  p*
is the  opportunity  cost  of equity  finance  for  the  p. ent in the  home country
(this  cost of equity  finance  is gross  of personal  taxes  paid by individual
investors).  If debt finance  is used by the parent,  the p-i*(l-u*),  the
net-of-corporare  tax cost of debt finance  in the home country. 9 As with
other models, this model does not give an explicit analysis  of optimal
financing  decisions  of the  multinational.  We would  need  to rely  on some
additional  assumptions  such as t1nkruptcy  costs or tax losses  to derive  a
unique  financial  policy  for  the  parent  firm.
MI. Exemption  of Foreign-Source  Income  by the  Home fountry
If a home country  exempts  the foreign  source  income  of the resident
parent  company,  the above analysis  can be easily  amended  as follows.  The
value of dividends  earned  by the subsidiary  in the host country  prior to
payment  of withholding  taxes  to the  host country  (equations  (1)  through  (4))
remains  the  same.  The  amount  of  taxes  imposed  on  remitted  income  is  the
withholding  tax  assessed  by  the  host  country,  OD*, as  denoted  in  home  country
currency.  Since  the  foreign-source  income  is  exempt  from  the  point  of view
of the  home country,  the  value  of dividends  received  by the  parent  is:
2/ As mentioned  above some countries,  like the  United States,  may disallow
interest  costs, incurred  by the parent to finance  investments  by the
subsidiary, to be deducted from the home country's corporate tax.
Instead,  the interest  costs  may be attributed  to the subsidio  y implying
that the parent's  discount  rate cannot  equal to the net-of-home  country
tax interest  rate.- 92 -
Dht  - Dt(1-e).  (12')
The  parent  maximizes  the  discounted  value  of  net-of-withholding  tax  dividends
A
as in  equation  (13)  (where  at  - 0).  The  control  variables  are  Kt,  Kt,  and
Bt.  Financial  policy  must be constrained  in this problem  to prohibit  the
multinational  from issuing  unlimited  amounts  of debt.  It is assumed  that
debt finance  can be i.o  more than the  value of the firm and no less than
zero.  This  problem  yields  the  following  results:
a.  User  Cost  of Capital
The user cost of capital  obtained  for the case of exemption  is the
following:
F_  (6R-n*)  [1  - A]  (15')
(1-u)
R  - Min f(l-u),  p/(l-c))
A  _a
a+R-  (w*-w)
For investments  -~de  by multinationals  resident  in countries  that
exempt foreign-source inicome,  the user cost of capital is much less
complicated  than that obtained  for the deferral  case.  It is also more
familiar  since it is quite similar  to the  usual formulation  found in the
literature.  There  are,  however,  two  adjustments  to the  user  cost  of capital
in this context  that are not well known.  The first  is that the discount
rate  of the  multinational  is the  nominal  financial  cost of finance  adjusted
for the  home country's  inflation  rate.  The second  adjustment  is that the
present value of tax depreciation  allowances for the multinational  is
discounted  by the nominal  cost of finance  net of capital  gains earned  by
holding  wealth in the host country's  currency.  With respect  to the real- 93  -
capital  gains  due  to  currency  appreciation,  note that  under  purchasing  power
parity,  capital  gains  on securities  are  equal  to (w*-w)  for  each  unit  of the
host country's  currency. This  term is  used in discounting  tax :  Leciation
allowances  since appreciation  in the value  of the host country's  currency
increases  the  value  of the  tax  depreciation  allowances  in  the  home country's
currency.
b.  The  Cost  of Finance
As indicated  above in expression  (15'),  the cost  of finance,  R, is
the  minimum  of the  cost  of debt  finance  raised  in  the  host  country
(i(l-u))  or the  cost  of equity  finance  for  the  multination  (p/(l-c))  with c
the capital gains tax, if there is one, imposed by the host or home
country).  In principle,  the multinational  uses the least cost form of
finance. If the  multinational  parent  finances  its  capital  with debt  raised
in the  home country,  then  p - l*(l-u*). This implies  that  debt finance  is
raised  in the  host country  only  if i(l-u)  < i*(l-u*)  or  vice  versa.  If the
multinational  parent's  cost  of equity  finance  at home,  p*,  then  the  optimal
choice  of finance  depends  on minimum  cost  of p*,  i*(l-u*)  and  i(1-u).
The artificial  bounds imposed  on financing  decisions  ensures  that
the  multinational  prefers  one form  of finance  or another. Unlike  the  case
of deferral  which  leads  to  an optimal  debt  policy,  the  financial  decision  in
this  model leads  to corner  solution  when taxes  imposed  on equity  and debt
income are different.  Imposire  artificial  constraints,  however,  is not
satisfactory. One would like a model  to explain  financial  choices  without
imposing  artificial  constraints  on financing. As discussed  earlier,  in an
alternative  model that incorporates  bankruptcy  costs  or tax losses,  a more
satisfactory determination of financial policy can be  obtained.  In
particular,  in the  presence  of bankruptcy  cost,  the  discount  rate  may be a- 94 -
weighted  average  of the  cost  debt  and  equity  finance,  the  weights  being  the
proportion  of capital  f4nanced  by debt  fo:  equity.
III. Full  Taxation  of Foreign  Source  Income  by the  Home  Country
The final  case to be examined  here arises  with respect  to the full
taxation of  foreign-source income of a parent's operation in another
country.  This case particularly  applies  to branches  of a parent in that
most countries allow a parent to credit foreign  corporate  income  taxes
against the taxes levied  by the home country  on fcreign-source  profits.
Unlike  the  case  of deferral,  all  income,  as  measured  by the  home country,  is
taxed  whether  or not the income  is remitted. Host countries  also apply  a
withholding  tax  on the  branch  profits  regardless  of whether  the  profits  are
remitted.
The model  for full taxation of foreign-source  income requires
earlier expressions  in Section I to be amended  as follows.  First, the
foreign tax credit expression  of equation  (6) no longer  depends on the
dividend  payment  of the  subsidiary  to the  parent. Instead,  the foreign  tax
credit  i3  equal  to corporate  income  and  withholding  taxes  paid to the  host
country  on  br -. ch  profits  as defined  by the  host  country:
FTCt  - Ttxt  +  n  Htxt  (6'')
with 9' denoting the withholding tax on branch profits and 1t denoting
taxable income  of the branch profits  as defined  by the host country (the
expression  in the  parenthesis  of equation  (2)).
The home country allows the taxes to be credited against taxes
assessed  on  branch  profits. Taxes  on foreign-source  branch  profits  levied  by
the  home  country,  net  of the  foreign  tax  credit,  are  equal  to the  following:- 95  -
Tt - u*1T*  - u*(e*  FCKt  - a*K* - iB x ) -FTC  (7'') t  t  ~~~~tt  t  t  t
A
whereby  K*t  is the  base  for  capital  cost  allowance  defined  in equation  (9).
The parent  maximizes  the present  value of dividends  received  over
time. Dividends  are  equa'  to the  net-of-wathholding  tax income  received  from
the  branch  operating  in  the  host  country,  D*(l-0'),  net  of taxes  paid  to the
home country  (expression  7'').  The  value  of equity  in this  case is  equal  to
the  folloiag:
E-  I  ePtD*  (1-0')  - T* -cE  )dt
0  0  t 
Since  the  corporate  and  withholding  taxes  paid  to the  host  country  are
credited  against  home country  tax  all  terms  associated  with O'and  K drop  out.
A
The  only  control  variables  are  Kt ,  Kt, and  Bt.  The  first  order  conditions
obtain  for  this  problem  are  rearranged  and  reported  below.
The  User Cost  of Cagital: Full  Taxation  to  Foreien-Source  Income
The  user cost  of  capital  for  the  case  of full  taxation  of foreign-source
income  is the  following:
F'  - (5+n-ir*)  (I-A*)  (15'')
(1 -U*)
with  A* - u*a*/(a*+p).
The user - st of capital  in this case  depends  only  on tax  parameters
relevant to the home country, not  the host country.  We note that tax
depreciation  allowances  are  not  discounted  by a rate  inclusive  of real  capital
gains  earned  by holding  wealth  in the  host  country. The reason  for  this  is
A
that  the  tax  depreciation  allowance  base,  K*,  is denominated  in  home country
currency.- 96  -
As a final  point  the  cost  of finance  for  the  parent,  p, depends  on the
aources  of finance,  debt  or equity,  raised  in the  home country. The  cost  of
finance  is either  the  minimum  of t*(1-u*)  or p*/(1-c)  or weighted  average  of
these two net-of-corporate  tax costs of finance.  As dincussed  above,  the
appropriate  discount rate depends on the type of equiliorium  attained  in
financial  markets.- 97 -
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